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Since 1917, tie-ins imposed by "dominant" sellers or buyers have
been held to be per se illegal on the theory that their sole function is to
permit such producers to wield "monopolistic [or monopsonistic] lever-
age."1 According to the Supreme Court, such agreements enable the
firms in question to use their power in the tying market to gain an un-
deserved advantage or leverage when marketing or purchasing their
tied products. In fact, the illegality of such agreements is premised on
the assumption that they intrude an "irrelevant and alien factor" 2 into
the competitive process that "result[s] in economic harm to competition
in the 'tied' [product] market." 3 Indeed, the leverage generated by such
tie-ins is supposed to enable the tying producers to create second monop-
olies beyond the scope of their first. Thus, according to the Court, "tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition."4
Recently, in an attempt to justify their conclusion that systematic
reciprocity is also prohibited by the antitrust laws, the Court,5 the FTC,G
and numerous antitrust commentators7 have contended that this lever-
age theory of tie-ins applies mutatis mutandis to reciprocal dealing as
well. On this account, the reciprocal dealer's patronage simply replaces
the "monopolist's" tying product as the fulcrum of the conditional sales
lever which such producers allegedly use to raise their total market
power.
In fact, however, the leverage theory does not provide an adequate
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explanation of either tie-ins or reciprocity. Both devices are typically
employed in situations in which they do not increase the tying firm's
power in its tied product market. Indeed, even on the rare occasions on
which such agreements do generate leverage, this effect is usually inci-
dental to their rationale.
This analysis of tie-ins, reciprocity, and the leverage theory will be
published in three parts. In Part I, the functions of seller-imposed tie-
ins will be investigated. Part II will be concerned with the functions of
buyer-imposed tie-ins and reciprocity. In Part III, the legality and wel-
fare effects of these practices will be analyzed.
Although their similarity has been both exaggerated and misunder-
stood,8 seller-imposed tie-ins, buyer-imposed tie-ins, and reciprocity
programs frequently do perform parallel functions. Hence, it may be
useful to delineate the various goals that seller-imposed tie-ins can
achieve before attempting to analyze buyer-imposed tie-ins or the prac-
tice of reciprocity.
It is generally supposed that seller-imposed tie-ins "serve hardly any
purpose other than the suppression of competition" in the tied product
market. In fact, even if they are interpreted in the most economically
meaningful way, the decisions of the Supreme Court declaring such
agreements illegal appear to be based on the assumption that the only
reason "dominant" sellers ever impose tie-ins on their customers is to
enable themselves to raise price and restrict output in the general
market for the tied commodity. In what follows, we will demonstrate
that this assumption is not correct, i.e., that the profitability of tie-ins
does not depend on the alleged ability of such agreements to increase
the power of the tying producer in the general market for the tied
product. In particular, we will show that such agreements can be used
for four pricing purposes-(1) to increase the profitability of non-mar-
ginal cost pricing, (2) to implement a system of meter pricing, (3) to
increase the profitability of price discrimination, and (4) to conceal
violations of maximum or minimum price regulations-and for two
non-pricing purposes-(1) to prevent the use of inferior complements
and (2) to reduce the aggregate taxes, royalties, and franchise fees due
on the tying firm's profits or sales. Since the profitability of these func-
tions does not depend on their decreasing competition in the general
market for the tied product, our demonstration will undermine the
Court's rationale for declaring all such agreements illegal.
8. See sources cited in note 7 supra and materials cited therein.
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I. Pricing Functions
1. Increasing the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost Pricing
It is commonly accepted that whenever a seller faces a downward-
sloping demand curve, he will find it profitable to charge his customers
more than his marginal cost for their marginal purchases. This conclu-
sion is simply a restatement of the familiar proposition that producers
who face negatively-sloped demands can increase their profits by re-
stricting output and raising price above marginal cost. In doing so, they
trade the profits they sacrifice on the unit sales they lose for the added
returns they realize on the sales they retain at the higher price. Obvi-
ously, the greater the ratio of the added returns realized on the retained
sales to the profits sacrificed on the lost sales, the more profitable non-
marginal cost pricing. In what follows, we shall argue that sellers will
frequently be able to increase this ratio by employing full requirements
tie-ins (i.e., full-line forcing) to shift the locus of their non-marginal
cost pricing from their tying to their tied product. In order to execute
this policy, the seller in question will reduce the price of his tying
product and use the surplus his customers realize on their purchases of
this good at the lower price to induce them to contract to purchase
their full requirements of the tied product from him as well for more
than its prevailing market price, i.e., the seller will condition his sale
of his tying product on favorable terms to its users on their agreeing to
give him their patronage on another product which he sells to them
for more than its prevailing market price. If the ratio of added returns
to sacrificed profits just described is higher for non-marginal cost pric-
ing on the tied than on the tying product-e.g., if the relative de-
crease in the sales of the tied product that will be caused by any given
increase in its price is lower than its counterpart for the tying product
for a comparable price rise, such a transfer may enable the tying
producer to increase the profitability of non-marginal cost pricing
by reducing the amount of profits he must sacrifice (on his lost unit
sales) in order to realize any given amount of additional returns on his
retained sales by increasing his per unit charge.
It should be noted at the outset that our explanation of the profit-
ability of full-requirements tie-ins will not depend in any way on the
alleged ability of such agreements to increase the tying producer's
power in the market for the tied product. In fact, the imposition of
full-requirements tie-ins will rarely if ever injure competition in the
tied product market. Such issues will be examined in detail in Part
III of this article. In what follows, we will attempt to explain the way
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in which and the conditions under which full-requirements tie-ins or
full-line forcing can increase the profitability of non-marginal cost
pricing.
A. A Diagrammatic and Conceptual Framework for Our Analysis
(1) The Diagrammatic Framework
Diagram I will be used to illustrate the ways in which seller-imposed
tie-ins can enable producers to increase the profitability of non-mar-
ginal cost pricing. In this diagram, DDxAy (read as "the demand X faces
when selling A to Y") 9 indicates the demand curve faced by some seller
For the reader's convenience, an ad-
ditional set of detachable diagrams has
been included at the end of this
article (following page 1472)-Es.
X nhi also CXAYI... Nc
Y1 .. N.. .N




X on his sales of A to his customers Y1 ... N, i.e., the amount that
Y1 ... N would be willing to pay X for successive units of A. Normally,
Y1 ... N will not be willing to pay X the actual value of his product to
them, i.e., normally DDxAY =A (does not equal) DDnR, the curve that
9. Throughout this analysis, the letters "A" and "B" will represent products while"X,'" "Y," and "Z" will refer to sellers and/or buyers. In subscripts, the letter precedingA or B will refer to the seller of the product in question and the letter succeeding A or
B will indicate its buyer. Thus, MRYAz connotes the marginal revenue curve seller Y faces
when distributing product A to Z.
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represents the price that Y would be willing to pay if he could not pur-
chase A or a substitute from anyone but X. In fact, DDxAr will equal
DDfy only (1) if X is a classical monopolist1 -i.e., if X is the only
producer of some product A for which there are no substitutes-or
(2) if X can discover some means of inducing his customers to treat him
as a monopolist, i.e., to agree not to purchase A or one of its substitutes
from any of X's competitors-e.g., if X can induce Y1 ... N to enter




In general, the more competitive industry A, the greater the diver-
gence between DDxAy and DDxAr. Thus, if as in Diagram II industry
A were perfectly competitive, X would be precluded from extracting
the full value of his product to its users by the offers of other producers
to sell A for a price equal to their minimum average total cost, i.e.,
10. See Olson and McFarland, The Restoration of Pure Monopoly and the Concept
of the Industry, 76 Qj. ECON. 612-31 (1962).
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DDxAY would not equal DDXay but the lower of DDxar or some other
curve whose height equalled the minimum average total cost of pro-
ducing A.
Where Y1 ... N are intermediate buyers, DDX AT will equal the (net)
marginal revenue product of A for Y-i.e., DDxaY will be equal to the
additional net revenue that successive units of A generate for Y1 ... N.
Thus, if A is a final product and Y1 ... N are retail distributors who
practice single pricing-i.e., who set one price for A and allow their
customers Z1 ... N to purchase as much A as they like at that price,
Y's demand curve for A will be equal to the difference between the
marginal revenue curve he faces when distributing A to ZI ... N and
the other marginal costs of engaging in this activity, i.e., DDxar =
MRAz minus the non-cost-of-goods-sold marginal cost of distributing
A to Z. In what follows, we will assume that these non-cost-of-goods-sold
marginal costs are zero, i.e., that DDxar- MRyAz.
MRxA-y in Diagram I is defined to be X's total marginal revenue
curve. MRxAY indicates the additional revenue X will obtain by in-
creasing his sales if he single prices, i.e., if his only charge is a uniform
price for each unit of A his customers purchase.
We have already noted that D~xOa, DDxAr, and MRxAy are total
functions-i.e., that they represent the summation of the full value,
demand, and marginal revenue curves of X's individual customers Y1,
Y2.... YN. In constructing Diagram I, we have assumed that all of X's
customers have identical demand curves. This simplifying assumption
will be relaxed as our investigation proceeds.
MCxAY is X's marginal cost curve. For expositional reasons, we will
depart from normal practice by defining MCxAy so that it does not
include marginal pricing and promotional costs. Like the other total
curves represented, MCxAr is itself the composite of the marginal costs
X incurs in supplying A to each of his customers.
(2) The Conceptual Framework
Let us define the phrase "transaction surplus" (TS) to refer to the
difference between the variable (marginal) cost of different amounts of
any particular product and the amount that its immediate buyers would
be willing to pay for the output in question. Thus, if consumers are
willing to pay $5 for the first unit, $3 for the second, and $1 for the
third, and if the marginal cost of each unit is $1, transaction surplus
1402
Vol. 76: 1397, 1967
Tie-ins
will equal $6 (= $4 + $2 + $0). As defined, transaction surplus will
increase with sales so long as the market value of additional output
exceeds the market value of the resources expended in its production
and distribution-i.e., so long as DD exceeds MC. Accordingly, trans-
action surplus will be maximized at the point at which DD cuts MC
from above, and the single transaction surplus-maximizing (TSM) price
will be equal to the seller's marginal cost at the corresponding TSM
output.
Accordingly, in Diagram I, the total transaction surplus generated
by any volume of X's sales to Y will be equal to the area between DDxAy
and MCxAy as quantity varies from zero to the output in question.
Hence, total transaction surplus will increase with sales so long as
DDxay exceeds MCxAY. Where DDxAY cuts MCxAY from above, total
transaction surplus will be maximized. In Diagram I, this maximizing
output is si = od; the TSM price is os; and the corresponding trans-
action surplus is tie. Clearly, rie will be larger the greater the dollar
volume of sales represented by any point on the diagram, the larger si
and the steeper the slopes of DDxAr (upward) and MCxAY (downward)
to the left of the total transaction surplus-maximizing (TSM) output.
To anticipate our subsequent analysis, transaction surplus is nor-
mally divided between sellers and buyers-i.e., some of the transaction
surplus generated by X's production and/or distribution of A is
realized by his customers in the form of buyer surplus and some, by X
himself in the form of seller surplus. The term "buyer surplus" refers
to the difference between the total cost of any product to its immediate
purchasers and the highest fee that they would have chosen to pay
rather than electing to do without the goods in question." "Seller
surplus" connotes the difference between the total revenue that any
seller receives on his sales of a particular product and the total marginal
(variable) costs he has to incur to produce and/or distribute the output
under consideration. Thus, if X in Diagram I decides to allow his
customers to buy as much A as they like at price oj = Ic per unit, his
sales will be oc = jI, transaction surplus rlhe, buyer surplus rlj, and
seller surplus jihe.
In what follows, we will normally identify the participants in various
transactions by their general status in the economic system. Thus, if X
11. It should be noted that this consumer surplus is generally less than the gross gain
that buyers already realize, i.e., that "buyer surplus" refers to the gain buyers realize from
purchasing the particular commodity in question from the specified supplier instead of
one of its (and/or his) substitutes.
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is a manufacturer who sells directly to A's final consumers Y1 ... N, the
terms seller and buyer surplus will be replaced by the signs producer
surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS) respectively. Since the tie-ins
under consideration typically involve manufacturers and their local
distributors, our discussion will usually concern retailer rather than
consumer surplus, i.e., RS rather than CS. Accordingly, unless other-
wise specified, producer surplus will be seller surplus, and retailer
surplus, buyer surplus. Of course, if we turn from Washington to the
American eagle, the buyer surplus that retailers Y1 ... N realize on
their purchases from X will appear as seller surplus, gained on their
sales to final consumers Z1 ... N.
It should be noted that producer surplus and producer or retailer
profits are not equivalent terms. In addition to their cost of goods sold,
producers and retailers must also deduct their fixed costs and all of their
pricing and promotional 2 costs before computing their conventional
profits. Since a producer's fixed costs (e.g., the cost of his plant and
equipment) are by definition fixed (i.e., since they do not vary with his
output), he will maximize his profits by employing a strategy that maxi-
mizes the difference between his seller surplus and his variable pricing
and promotional costs. Obviously, where pricing and/or promotional
costs are positive, this goal may not be compatible with maximizing
producer surplus alone. In what follows, we will assume that producers
and retailers try to maximize their profits in their production, promo-
tion, and pricing decisions, and accordingly that their maximand is
the difference between their producer surplus and the pricing and
promotional costs they incur when making their sales. In order to
simplify our analysis, we will also assume that X's customers do not
have to incur any fixed costs in order to use the products he sells.'8
B. The Pricing Function of Full-Requirements Tie-ins or Full-line
Forcing: Increasing the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost Pricing
In this section, we will investigate the possibility that full-require-
ments tie-ins may be used to increase the profitability of non-marginal
cost pricing. Our hypothesis will be that where producers who engage
12. We continue for the present our admittedly unrealistic assumption that Y1 ... N
do not incur any non-promotional marginal distribution costs.
13. This premise will enable us to assume that X can remove all of Y's buyer surplus
without endangering his long-run customer relationships. If fixed costs were positive,
the elimination of all of Y's buyer surplus would leave him with negative returns cqual
to the rate of depredation of his fixed assets, i.e., would induce him not to rcnew his
plant and continue producing in the long run.
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in non-marginal cost pricing can find some suitable good (B) to tie, they
will be able to increase their returns by reducing the unit price of their
tying product A and conditioning its sale on their customers' agreeing
to purchase their full requirements of B from them as well for more
than its prevailing market price.
14
Since the process of identifying a suitable product to tie, of devising,
executing, and enforcing the tying agreement, and of supplying the tied
commodity to the vendee will usually be too expensive to justify the
tie-in in any other circumstances, full-requirements tie-ins will usually
be employed only where the transactions involved are substantial.
Accordingly, such agreements will normally be imposed on interme-
diate buyers who are entering into long-term leases (where A is a
durable machine and YJ ... N are manufacturers), full-requirements
contracts (where A is a non-durable intermediate product and Y1 ... N
are manufacturers), franchise agreements (where A is a final product
and Y1 ... N are wholesale or retail distributors), or licenses (where A
is a patented process or idea). For example, if our hypothesis is correct,
a final-product producer may be able to increase his profits by reducing
the price he charges his distributors for his highly differentiated prod-
uct in exchange for their agreeing to give him all of their patronage on
another product which he sells to them for more than its market price.
Since our hypothesis is that full-requirements tie-ins may be em-
ployed to increase the profitability of non-marginal cost pricing, their
importance will be directly related to the prevalence of this practice.
Hence, before we proceed to analyze the way in which full-line forcing
operates, it may be useful to demonstrate the profitability of non-
marginal cost pricing.
(1) The Rationale for Non-marginal Cost Pricing
If X and Y were not different entities-i.e., if X were fully integrated
forward into distribution, X would not have to be concerned about the
way in which the transaction surplus he generated was divided between
himself and his "customer," for in such circumstances, this division
would be entirely artificial, and his producer surplus would be equal to
the producer and retailer surplus he generated. However, since the
non-integrated firm will not benefit from the surplus its customers
realize, it may not find it profitable to charge these buyers its actual
and TSM marginal cost for their incremental purchases. In fact, re-
14. For a qualification, see note 23 infra and p. 1414.
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gardless of whether such a firm employs a single or complicated pricing
strategy, i.e., regardless of whether it engages in single or lump-sum
pricing, it will almost always find it profitable to charge non-marginal
cost prices when it faces a negatively sloped demand.
(a) The Profitability of Charging Non-marginal Cost Single Prices
If X decides to engage in single pricing, i.e., to charge his customers
no basic fee and the same price for each unit of his product they pur-
chase, his profit-maximizing price will always exceed his actual and
TSM marginal cost whenever the slope of his demand is negative to the
left of his TSM output, for when this condition prevails, X's price will
exceed his marginal revenue and hence his marginal cost where mar-
ginal cost and marginal revenue are equal. In other words, although
marginal cost pricing will maximize the transaction surplus X gener-
ates, it will reduce his profits when demand is downward-sloped, for
when marginal revenue is less than price, it will also be less than
marginal cost when price and marginal cost are equal. Thus, although
non-marginal cost price cl = oj in Diagram I will reduce the transaction
surplus (TS) X generates by lih, it will increase his producer surplus
(PS) by flts-thi since the loss it causes his independent customers-flis-
will be completely external to him. In fact, price cl is X's single "profit-
maximizing" price, i.e., it is the price at which his marginal revenue
and marginal cost are equal, the price which generates more producer
surplus than any other "single" alternative. Thus, whenever a firm that
practices single pricing faces a negatively sloped demand curve, its
optimal price will exceed its actual and TSM marginal cost, i.e., will
exceed the price which would maximize the transaction surplus it
generates.
(b) The Profitability of Combining Lump-sum and Non-marginal
Cost Pricing
Although it is generally assumed that sellers who charge their cus-
tomers the single price that equates their marginal revenue and mar-
ginal cost are maximizing their profits, more complicated, lump-sum
pricing strategies will often generate enough additional producer sur-
plus to justify the additional pricing costs their employers must incur.
Since most sellers who are in a position to employ full-requirements
tie-ins--i.e., who are engaged in substantial transactions with their
individual customers-will also be able to increase their returns by
charging their customers a lump-sum fee in addition to their per unit
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price, the function with which we are now concerned would be rela-
tively unimportant if firms that engaged in such lump-sum pricing
did not usually charge non-marginal cost unit prices as well. Fortu-
nately for our purposes, sellers that practice lump-sum pricing will
almost always be able to increase their returns by reducing their basic
fee and charging their customers more than their actual and TSM
marginal costs for each additional purchase they make. In the text that
follows, we will delineate the reasons why such firms typically find it
profitable to engage in non-marginal cost pricing. The factors that
determine the relative profitability of lump-sum and single pricing are
discussed in Appendix A.
Since the producer surplus generated by optimal single pricing will
necessarily be less than the maximum amount of transaction surplus
that any seller who faces a negatively sloped demand curve could create,
such producers will often find it profitable to engage in lump-sum
pricing, i.e., to reduce their per unit price and extract their customers'
buyer surplus by requiring them to pay a lump-sum fee for the right to
purchase their product at the price in question. In fact, if demand were
certain, any producer who could engage in perfect marginal cost lump-
sum pricing-i.e., who could extract all of his customers' surplus in a
lump sum, without charging them more than his marginal cost for their
marginal purchases-would be able to raise his producer surplus to the
maximum amount of transaction surplus he could generate. Thus, if
instead of practicing single pricing, seller X in Diagram I (1) set his
unit price equal to his TSM marginal cost (os = bg), (2) forced those
buyers who did purchase from him to pay a lump-sum fee (rgs) equal to
the value of the right to purchase his product at that price,10 and (3)
prevented buyer arbitrage, he would increase his total producer surplus
from jihe to maximum transaction surplus rie, i.e., he would absorb the
surplus his customers realized under optimal single pricing-nrj-and
simultaneously generate and absorb the transaction surplus that his
non-marginal cost unit price originally destroyed-lih.
Of course, in any given case, the additional surplus that lump-sum
15. A lump-sum fee of rgs would just equal the difference between the value that X's
individual customers would place on sg = ob of A (the amount of A each would buy at
price os per unit) and the total sum they would have to pay for sg of A if they could
purchase this commodity at the unit price in question-i.e., rgs equals the difference
between the area under dd_,Iy... ., from 0 to b-rgbo-and the area that represents
the marginal fees that Y1 . . . N would each have to pay under the arrangement in
question--(sg) (os) = sgbo. Of course, X could accomplish the same result by offering to
sell YZ, Y2 .... YN sg of A for rgbo, but since demand is usually uncertain, the formu-
lation used in the text will be far more typical.
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pricing enables a producer to realize may not exceed the extra cost of
devising, executing, and enforcing the associated agreements, but
clearly, where the gain in surplus is substantial-e.g., where demand is
steeply sloped and the customers in question make large and repeated
purchases-lump-sum pricing will frequently be profitable. Since, as
we have seen, 16 the full-requirements tie-ins we are now discussing will
only be profitable if imposed on high-volume buyers, who are also
likely subjects for lump-sum pricing, the explanatory value of our
theory that full-requirements tie-ins can be used to increase the effi-
ciency of non-marginal cost pricing depends on the profitability of
combining this technique with lump-sum pricing. In fact, for several
reasons, producers who charge lump-sum fees will almost always find it
profitable to reduce their basic charge and set their per unit price above
their actual and TSM marginal cost. Indeed, such a mixed pricing
strategy will often be profitable where pure lump-sum pricing would
not.
(i) Imperfect Knowledge and the Profitability of Combining Lump-
sum and Non-marginal Cost Pricing
So far, we have assumed that both X and his customers will always
find it possible and profitable to determine exactly what DDxAy will be.
Since X's lump-sum offer will normally cover a considerable period of
time, this assumption is clearly unjustified. In this subsection, we will
delineate three ways in which imperfections of knowledge may increase
the profitability of non-marginal cost pricing.
(a) Uncertainty, Risk, and the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost
Pricing7
When Y1 ... N do not know themselves how much they will need X's
product during the period covered by his offer, they will rarely be
willing to pay X the expected value' 8 of the right to purchase his
16. See p. 1405 supra.
17. Parts of this argument are based on Burstein's explication of meter pricing. See
Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62, 69-71 (1960).
18. In order to determine the value of the right X is attempting to sell, Y1 . .. N will
have to (1) estimate the various possible shapes that their demand for A might take during
the period under consideration, (2) attach probabilities to each of these possible demands,
and (3) take the weighted average height of these demands at each relevant quantity. The
curve connecting these points will represent Y1 . . . N's "expected demand for A." The
"expected value" of the right X is selling is equal to the area between expected DDXAY
and X's unit price. Accordingly, the expected value of this right will be equal to its actual
value only if YJ . N'* avtuzl demand for A "equals" their expected demand, i.e., only
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product at his TSM price. In general, the greater the risk that the
actual value of A to Y1... N will be less than its expected value'0 and
the greater YI ... N's aversion to taking such risks, the greater the
difference between the expected value of the right to purchase X's
product at some specified price and the price that YI ... N will be
willing to pay X for this right, i.e., the greater the difference between
the expected value of this right and its certainty equivalent value.-
Both these relationships will frequently contribute to the profitability
of non-marginal cost pricing.
By engaging in non-marginal cost pricing, X can effectively transfer
the risk that DDxjy may be lower than expected from his customers to
himself, for the smaller X's lump-sum fee and the higher his per unit
price, the more responsive Yl ... N's payments to variations in their
demand for A and the smaller the loss they will incur (and the greater
the loss X will incur) if their demand is less intense than they antici-
pated. In many situations, this shift will improve X's prospects-i.e.,
will increase X's certainty equivalent returns,2 ' for X will frequently
if the area between actual DD,AY and X's unit price equals the area between expected
DDXAy and X's unit price. This result would obtain, for example, if actual and expected
demand coincided.
19. Since the actual value of the right X is selling will be determined by DDx~r, his
customers will be able to associate a value with each of the demands they might have for
his product. Thus, if probabilities can be attached to each of their possible demands,
it will be possible to represent the different prospective values of the right to purchase
A by a probability distribution. Broadly speaking. the greater the average variation in
Y1... 2V's different demands for A, the greater the variance of the distribution, and the
greater the risk that the actual value of the right to purchase A will be any given amount
less than its expected value.
20. An example may help to clarify this point. If Y believes that there is a 4 chance
that the right X is selling will be worth $20 to him, a V2 chance that it will be worth $40,
and a 1/ chance that it will be worth $48, the expected or weighted average value of this
right will equal 1($20) + V2($40) + ($48) = $37. On the other hand, its certainty equiv-
alent value will be equal to the price that Y is actually willing to pay for this right, i.e.,
for a lottery ticket with the probability distribution of values described above. Thus, if
Y is averse to taking risks, he will not be willing to pay $37 for the right to purchase A
at the specified price, i.e., the certainty equivalent value of this right will be less than
its expected value. In general, the greater Y's risk aversion, the greater the difference
between the price he will be willing to pay for this right and its expected value to him,
i.e., the greater the discount he will demand for taking the / chance that its actual value
will be $17 less than its expected value.
21. Where DDZ.Y cannot be easily determined, X's maximand will be his certainty
equivalent return rather than his actual profits, i.e., given uncertainty, X's optimal strat-
egy will be to estimate a probability distribution of the possible demands for his product
and adopt the particular pricing policy which, given this estimate, will produce the most
attractive probability distribution of possible returns. In general, the greater the expected
(weighted average or mean) value of the distribution, and the smaller its dispersion (as-suming risk aversion), the higher its certainty equivalent value, i.., the higher the pricethat the seller would be willing to pay for a lottery ticket which offered tie same dis-
tribution of possible returns. Thus, where demand is uncertain, the seller's calculations
will be far more complicated than those required for conventional profit-maximization.
It should be noted as well that the introduction of uncertainty will also affect the
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be less averse to taking risks than his (weighted) average customer and
non-marginal cost pricing will often increase X's risk less than it de-
creases Y1 ... N's.
Where A is either an intermediate good that Y1 ... N use to produce
some final product D or a final good that Yl ... N distribute in partial
or total competition with each other, the gains that Y1 ... N will realize
by exercising their right to purchase A at X's TSM marginal cost will
increase with their sales of D or A respectively. Under these circum-
stances, the extra risk that X will have to bear under non-marginal cost
pricing will be less than the additional risk that Y1 ... N would have
to run under marginal cost lump-sum pricing, for X will have to be
concerned only with the possibility that the industry-wide demand for
D or A might be less than had been expected while Y1 ... N will also
have to consider prospective variations in their individual shares of
industry sales.
Indeed, even if the extra risk to X under non-marginal cost pricing
were as great as the additional (weighted average) risk to Y1, Y2,... YN
under marginal cost lump-sum pricing, Y1 ... N's uncertainty about
their need for A might still increase the profitability of non-marginal
cost pricing, for X will frequently be less averse to taking risks than his
(weighted) average customer. Thus, to the extent that risk aversion is
inversely related to the bearer's ability to sustain losses, large, well-
financed companies will find that non-marginal cost pricing will reduce
the discount demanded by the actual risk bearer even if it does not
reduce the actual risk incurred. Accordingly, prosperous manufacturers
may be able to increase their returns by reducing their lump-sum fees
and charging their small, local distributors non-marginal cost prices for
their incremental purchases.
In short, the existence of uncertainty will normally increase the
profitability of non-marginal cost pricing, for to the extent that X's risk
and/or risk aversion are less than his customers', the extra discount they
will demand for bearing the additional risk they must run under mar-
ginal cost lump-sum pricing will be greater than the cost to X of
producer's share of the transaction surplus that will be generated by perfect lump-sum
pricing. As we have seen, when demand cannot be predicted with certainty, X's customers
will calculate the highest price that they will be willing to pay for the right to purchase
A at his TSM marginal cost in precisely the same way that X determines his optimal
pricing strategy, viz., by calculating its expected value and discounting this sum to ac.
count for the risk that its actual value may be less than its expected value. Accordingly,
given uncertainty, perfect lump-sum pricing will not equate producer and transaction
surplus unless the expected value of the right X sells exceeds its actual value by the dis.
count his customers demand for bearing the risk that DDAy may turn out to be lower
than they expect.
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reducing their risk by lowering his lump-sum fee and raising his per
unit charge above his actual and TSM marginal cost.
(b) Seller Ignorance and the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost
Pricing
Since it will usually be in Y1 ... N's interests to keep their demand
prices secret, X will rarely be able to determine the (certainty equiva-
lent) value they place on the right to purchase his product without
incurring prohibitive market research expenses. Accordingly, non-
marginal cost pricing may enable X to increase the percentage of the
value of his product he can expect to collect, for by delaying his charges
until Y1 ... N have actually exercised their rights, this technique will
absorb much of the surplus that X's ignorance would otherwise have
allowed his customers to retain. Since it will be particularly difficult
for X to determine Y1 . . . N's demand prices where their expected
demands differ significantly, non-marginal cost pricing will be es-
pecially profitable when it is likely to produce price discrimination, i.e.,
when X's total average (average lump-sum plus unit) price is likely
to differ among his customers. However, although different buyers will
normally be charged different average prices under non-marginal cost
lump-sum pricing, such discrimination is not a necessary condition for
the profitability of this practice. Thus, even if Y1 ... N have identical
expected and actual demands for A, non-marginal cost pricing will
decrease X's need for market research, which is always expensive and
somewhat inaccurate.
(c) Buyer Pessimism and the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost
Pricing
In many situations, X may be able to increase his prospective returns
by decreasing his dependence on the accuracy of his customers' esti-
mates of DDxAy, i.e., by reducing his advanced charge and increasing
the price of actually exercising the right to purchase his product, for
where Y1 ... N's estimates of their future demand for A are unduly
pessimistic, the highest lump-sum fee that they will be willing to pay
will not remove all the surplus they should expect to realize from
purchasing A at X's TSM price. Accordingly, to the extent that X
believes that his customers are underestimating their probable need
for A, he will find it profitable to substitute non-marginal cost prices
for part or all of his lump-sum fee.
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(ii) Low Transference Costs, Buyer Arbitrage, and the Profitability
of Non-marginal Cost Pricing
Where X's customers are not naturally separated by the cost of
transferring his product, the possibility of arbitrage may make it profit-
able for him to reduce his lump-sum fee and increase his per unit price
above his TSM marginal cost. Unless the cost of transferring A is
prohibitive, those Y's such as Y1 who actually do purchase from X will
be able to increase their returns by reselling some or all of their A to
other buyers for more than X's TSM marginal cost, i.e., for more than
the additional charge they have to pay for their incremental purchases
under marginal cost lump-sum pricing. Such cross-selling will reduce
X's returns by making it unnecessary for some of his customers to pay
a lump-sum fee, i.e., by depriving X of the lump-sum fee that those
buyers who purchase from his own customers would otherwise have
had to pay."
Of course, X may be able to prevent such resales by incorporating
customer-allocation clauses into his sales contracts, by entering into
resale price maintenance contracts which prohibit Y1 from supplying
A to Y2... N for less than X's average lump-sum plus unit price, by
lobbying for the passage of RPM statutes that accomplish the same re-
sults, or by making the A he sells Y1 unsuitable for Y2. . . N's purposes.
Clearly, however, none of these strategies will be foolproof, and all will
be expensive.
Accordingly, where transference costs are relatively low, X may be
able to increase his returns by decreasing his customers' incentive to
engage in arbitrage by reducing the difference between his unit price
and the average (lump-sum plus unit) price that buyers such as Y2 ... N
would have to pay him for his product, i.e., by reducing his lump-sum
fee and increasing his unit price above his TSM marginal cost. In some
cases, X may find it profitable to eliminate arbitrage altogether by rais-
ing his unit price and lowering his basic charge until this difference
between his unit and average price is less than the cost of transferring
his product, but even if he does not, he will probably choose to reduce
cross-selling by engaging in some non-marginal cross pricing.
22. Indeed, even if X succeeds in forcing YZ to surrender the profits he realizes on these
resales, he will not be able to recover as much net surplus as he could have absorbed on
his own, for Y1 will probably be less adept than X at exploiting ddy, . . . . and the sale
and resale of A will always increase the transference costs of supplying the customers in
question.
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(c) Summary
Thus, there are several reasons why producers who engage in lump-
sum pricing will usually find it profitable to combine this strategy with
non-marginal cost pricing. In general, the lower a seller's risk and risk
aversion in comparison to his customers', the greater his ignorance, the
more pessimistic his customers, and the smaller the cost of transferring
his product, the more profitable any given divergence between his unit
price and TSM marginal cost, i.e., the more profitable non-marginal
cost pricing. Now that we have shown that regardless of the general
pricing strategy they adopt, producers who face negatively-sloped de-
mand curves will almost always find it profitable to charge their cus-
tomers more than their TSM marginal cost for their incremental pur-
chases, we can proceed to analyze the way in which full-requirements
tie-ins may be used to increase the profitability of such non-marginal
cost pricing.
(2) The Pricing Function of Full-Requirements Tie-ins or Full-line
Forcing: Increasing the Profitability of Non-marginal Cost Pric-
ing
We have already suggested that the function of the tie-ins we are now
discussing is to increase the profitability of non-marginal cost pricing.
In analyzing this possibility, we will be concerned with situations in
which X's optimal lump-sum fee-itself an inverse function of the
profitability of non-marginal cost pricing-is less than the (certainty
equivalent) value that his customers place on the right to purchase his
product at his TSM marginal cost, or more generally, is less than the
difference between this value and the prospective profits that Y1 ... N's
bargaining strength enables them to retain. Obviously, under these cir-
cumstances, X will always find it profitable to raise his price sufficiently
above his TSM marginal cost to remove all of his customers' excess
expected surplus. Our hypothesis will be that full-requirements tie-ins
can enable X to increase the profitability of removing this surplus by
shifting the locus of his non-marginal cost pricing to products that are
better suited for this pricing technique, i.e., to products on which X
can absorb a greater percentage of his customers' excess surplus through
non-marginal cost pricing. More precisely, X will search for a product
which raises the ratio of the seller (producer) surplus that will be gained
to the buyer (retailer) surplus that will be lost through non-marginal
cost pricing, i.e., the S or ratio.
BS- RS-
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In order to be suitable for this purpose, the tied product B will have
to possess three characteristics. First, B must be sold in a rather com-
petitive market. Second, movements in Y1 ... N's demand for B must
parallel shifts in their demand for A. And third, Y1 . . . N's post-tie-
in demand for B-DDxBy ... x-must be more suitable for non-
marginal cost pricing than their demand for A, i.e., -S-+ -the pro-RS-
ducer surplus gained to retailer surplus lost ratio-must be higher on
DDXBy 1 ... N above B's prevailing market price (when DDrnr is hori-
zontal or above the highest price that X could charge for B under a
full-requirements contract without losing his customers' patronage
when DDxBy is negatively-sloped) 23 than on DDxArl... , above A's
TSM marginal cost, at least over some relevant range.
We have already noted that by entering into full-requirements con-
tracts, X can place his customers under a legal obligation to treat him
as a monopolist, i.e., X can obligate Y1 ... N not to purchase any of
his product or its substitutes from other suppliers. As we shall see, full-
requirements tie-ins operate in a similar fashion-viz., by enabling X
to price product B as if he were a monopolist within the limits set by
the excess surplus his customers expect to realize on his tying product.
Whether or not X produces B himself, the value of being able to price
in this manner will be directly related to the competitiveness of indus-
try B. In order for full-line forcing to enable X to increase his profits
on B (and hence on B + A), his requirements contract must raise the
demand he faces when selling B to Y1 ... N in such a way that he can
earn additional profits on B by taking advantage of the tie-in's ability
to enable him to raise the price he charges for this product without los-
ing his customers' patronage. Where X produces B himself, the require-
ments contract will have no effect on DDxBy if he has already monop-
olized its production, for obviously, where X is actually a monopolist,
his customers will have to treat him as such regardless of whether they
enter into requirements agreements. Accordingly, where X produces
product B, the suitability of this good for full-requirements tie-ins will
be directly related to the competition he faces in industry B, i.e., will
23. In the text, we will confine our analysis to situations in which DDXBr is originally
horizontal, i.e., to situations in which X either produces B in a perfectly corpetitive
market or purchases B for resale from other manufacturers. The case in which DDx.
is negatively sloped, i.e., in which B is either a differentiated product that X also produces
or a standardized product that X sells in an oligopolistic market, is analyzed in Appen.
dix B.
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be directly related to the extent to which DDryX ... z, and DDXDrl ... 2.
diverge.
In fact, the "competitive" requirement will even be justified (al-
though for somewhat different reasons) when X does not produce B
himself, for although DDR GBy... v7 will always exceed DDxzrx...
above B's prevailing market price if X purchases B in the open market,
the tie-in will not enable X to raise his price profitably if his sup-
plier is a monopolist. Where X's supplier is the only producer of B
and its substitutes, X will never find it profitable to use his ability to
charge more than his supplier's price without inducing his customers
to reject his offered tie-in, for his supplier's price will itself be the most
profitable price that could be charged for B, i.e., will itself be the
monopolistic price for B, the price at which A PS = 0. Obviously, the
greater the difference between his supplier's price and the price that a
monopolist would charge for the product in question-i.e., the greater
the competition his supplier faces in industry B, the more valuable the
effects of the tie-in, and the greater the profitability of tying B to A.
Thus, where X produces B himself, its suitability will be directly
related to the competition he faces when selling B, and where X buys
B from an independent producer, its suitability will be directly related
to the competition this supplier faces when marketing his product.
In either case, the profitability of tying B to A will increase with the
competitiveness of industry B.
But even if industry B is competitive, B will not be an efficient tied
product unless fluctuations in Y1 ... N's demand for B parallel shifts
in their demand for A (either or both because variations in the final
demand for B parallel those in the final demand for A and/or because
movements in Y1 ... N's market share in the distribution of A and B
and their substitutes are closely related). We have already shown that
X will vary his lump-sum fee and unit prices on A and B until inter
alia Y1 ... N's expected gain on A equals their expected loss on B
minus (1) the discount they demand for taking the risk that their loss
on B will exceed their gain on A, (2) X's lump-sum fee, and (3) the ex-
pected surplus that their bargaining strength enables them to retain.
Obviously, the greater the risk that Y/1 ... N's loss on B will exceed their
gain on A, the lower the unit prices and/or lump-sum fee that X will
be able to charge, and the less suitable B for X's purposes. Since
Y1 ... N's actual loss on B and gain on A will increase and/or decrease
with their demand for B and A respectively, B's suitability will be di-
rectly related to the extent to which shifts in Y1 ... N's demand for B
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parallel variations in their demand for A, i.e., to the extent to which
Y1 ... N's loss on B tends to increase (and decrease) with their gain
on A.
Finally, no product B can serve as a new locus for non-marginal cost
pricing unless Y71 ... N's post-tie-in demand for B is better adapted for
the application of this pricing technique than DDxAyI ... x. In fact,
since full-requirements tie-ins cannot be imposed without incurring
substantial pricing costs, they will normally be employed only where
they generate significantly more producer surplus than their employer
could obtain by doing all his non-marginal cost pricing on his tying
product.
As we have seen, if X single prices and charges his customers his TSM
price-i.e., a price equal to his marginal cost at his TSM output, the
producer surplus he expects to realize will be equal to the area between
his marginal cost curve and the horizontal line drawn from the TSM
output-price point to the $ axis. His immediate customers in turn will
expect to realize retailer surplus equal to the area between this hori-
zontal line and their demand curve. Any lump-sum fee his customers
have to pay in addition to their per unit charge will simply add to X's
seller or producer surplus and subtract from their buyer or retailer
surplus. Thus, if, in Diagram I, X charges Y"1 ... N os for each unit of
A they purchase, his (expected) producer surplus will equal sic plus
whatever lump-sum fee he extracts, and their (expected) retailer sur-
plus will equal ris minus the basic charge in question. Thus, X will be
able to remove this expected surplus minus the sum of the discount
Y71 ... N demand for bearing the attendant risk and the surplus their
bargaining strength enables them to retain by non-marginal pricing
without losing these customers' patronage. Obviously, the greater the
percentage of this excess (expected) retailer surplus that X can recover
by non-marginal cost pricing, the higher his profits will be-i.e., given
the maximum amount of retailer surplus that X can eliminate through
non-marginal cost pricing (given RS-), X's producer surplus will be
Ps+
directly related to n-- Our contention is that by shifting the locus of
his non-marginal cost pricing from A to some suitable product B, X
will be able to convert more of this retailer surplus into producer sur-
plus than he could by engaging in non-marginal cost pricing on A
alone.
But what determines the suitability of various products for such non-
marginal cost pricing? In general, the amount of producer surplus that
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can be gained by eliminating any given amount of buyer surplus
through non-marginal cost pricing will depend on the slopes of the
practicing seller's demand and marginal cost curves over the relevant
range (to the left of his TSM sales volume) and on the size of this TSM
output itself. In particular, the steeper the (negative or downward)
slope of the relevant demand curve to the left of the TSM sales volume,
the greater the (positive or upward) slope of the corresponding mar-
ginal cost curve to the left of the output in question, and the larger
the TSM output, the greater the effectiveness of this particular pricing
procedure-i.e., the greater the amount of producer surplus that the
seller will be able to realize by eliminating any given amount of buyer
surplus through non-marginal cost pricing on the product in question.
Diagrams III A-C have been constructed to illustrate these relation-
ships.
The effect of the slope of the demand curve on the producer surplus
that can be gained by eliminating any given amount of buyer surplus
through non-marginal cost pricing is manifest in Diagram III A. In this
representation, the slope of the MC curve to the left of the TSM output
and the size of that output itself have been held constant: only demand
has been changed. In general, the steeper the slope of the demand
curve, (1) the smaller the price rise necessary to eliminate any given
amount of buyer or retailer surplus, (2) the smaller the reduction in sales
and transaction surplus caused by any given increase in price, and ac-
cordingly, (3) the smaller the amount by which transaction surplus
will be reduced when any given amount of retailer surplus is removed
through non-marginal cost pricing. Since (PS+) = (RS-) - (TS-)
-i.e., since the increase in producer surplus is equal to the difference
between the retailer surplus lost and the transaction surplus lost, (PS+)
will be inversely related to (TS-). Hence, for any given reduction in
retailer surplus-i.e., for any given (RS-), (PS+) and concomitantly
Ps+P- will be inversely related to (TS-) and directly related to the slope
RS-
of the demand curve the seller faces.
Each of these relationships is manifest in Diagram III A. As you can
see, the amount of buyer surplus that will be eliminated by any given
price rise is directly related to the slope of the demand curve in ques-
tion. For example, a seller who raises his unit price AG above his TSM
marginal cost OA will reduce his customer's surplus by GHFA if he
faces DD-the most gently sloped demand curve over the relevant
range, by GIFA if he faces DD2-- which is somewhat more steeply
sloped, and by GJFA if he faces DDs-which is vertical between the
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prices in question. Accordingly, although a seller who wants to elim-
inate GIFA of his customer's surplus through non-marginal cost pricing
will have to raise his price only to OG (i.e., only by AG) if he faces
DD3, his counterparts facing DD, and DDt will have to increase their
unit price to OK and ON respectively. Thus, KMIG = lIF and
NPHG = HJF (NPLK = LMF)-i.e., the additional price rise of GK
for DDA and GN for DD, will remove an added amount of buyer sur-
plus that just equals the difference between the surplus that would be
eliminated by a price rise of A G for DD and the amount that such an
increase would remove if the demand curves were DD, and DD, re-
spectively.
The effect of this inverse relationship between the slope of the de-
mand curve and the price rise necessary to remove a given amount of
buyer surplus on the effectiveness of non-marginal cost pricing will be
reinforced by the inverse relationship between this slope and the
amount of transaction surplus that will be destroyed by any given in-
crease in price. By definition, the steeper the slope of the demand
AP'
curve (the higher -), the smaller the loss in sales (AQ) for any given
increase in price (AP). Since transaction surplus increases with sales
until the TSM output is reached, the amount of transaction surplus
that any given non-marginal cost price destroys will be directly related
to the amount by which that price reduces sales and hence inversely
related to the slope of the demand curve in question. In Diagram III A,
for example, an increase in price of A G will reduce sales by FC if de-
mand is moderately sloped like DD,, by FE if demand is steeply sloped
like DD,, and not at all if demand-like DD--is vertical over the
range in question. The corresponding losses in transaction surplus are
HFC, IFE, and zero respectively. Obviously, FC > FE > 0, and
HFC >IFE > 0.
Clearly, since both the increase in price necessary to remove any
given amount of buyer surplus and the amount of transaction surplus
destroyed for any given increase in price are inversely related to the
slope of the demand curve (averaged vertically) over the relevant
range, the amount of transaction surplus that will be destroyed in the
process of eliminating any given amount of buyer surplus through non-
marginal cost pricing will also be inversely related to the slope of the
demand curve in question. Since, for any given (RS-), (PS+) and
PS+
hence - will be inversely related to (TS-), the suitability of any
RS-
given demand curve for eliminating a given amount of retailer sur-
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plus through non-marginal cost pricing will be directly related to its
slope (averaged vertically) over the relevant range. Thus, in Diagram
III A, the seller who eliminates buyer surplus NPFA = KMFA =
GJFA through non-marginal cost pricing will destroy transaction sur.
plus PFB if he faces DD,, MFD if he faces DD2, and zero if he faces
DDs. Since PFB > MFD > 0, the gain in producer surplus and the
efficiency of non-marginal cost pricing PS- will both be directly
related to the slope of the demand curve in question. In Diagram III
NPBA KMDA




The importance of the TSM output is revealed in Diagram III B.
In this diagram, the slope of MCI always equals the slope of MC9 and
the slope of DD, always equals that of DD2 . Only the TSM outputs
have been changed. Ceteris paribus, the greater the TSM output, the
smaller the increase in price required to eliminate any given amount
of buyer surplus. As we have seen, the smaller the increase in price
necessary to eliminate any given amount of buyer surplus, the smaller
the associated reduction in transaction surplus and the larger the
associated increase in producer surplus-i.e., the more profitable non-
marginal cost pricing. Thus, although the slopes of DDI and DDa are
equal in diagram III B, the seller who faces DD, will be able to elim-
inate GIFA buyer surplus by increasing his price by only AG while
his counterpart facing DD, will have to raise his price by AJ to re-
move the same amount of buyer surplus: JKHG = HIFD. Since the
slopes of the two demand and marginal cost curves are equal to
the left of the TSM outputs, identical increases in price along either
curve will reduce sales and transaction surplus by the same amount. For
example, in Diagram III B, a price rise of AG will cause equal reduc-
tions in both sales (CD = EF) and transaction surplus (HDC =IFE)
along DDI and DD2. Since equal price rises reduce transaction surplus
equally, the fact that the increase in price required to eliminate
any given amount of buyer surplus is inversely related to the size
of the TSM output implies a direct relationship between the TSM
output and the profitability of removing any given amount of
buyer surplus through non-marginal cost pricing-i.e., implies a direct
relationship between (PS+) and PS+ and the size of the TSM outputRS-
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for any given (RS-). Thus, since in Diagram III B, (TS-) along DDt
(KDB) exceeds (TS-) along DD2 (IFE) by KHCB, both (PS+) and
S_ will be higher along the latter than along the former for anyRS-
given (.RS-).
The impact of the slope of the MC curve to the left of the TSM out-
put on the effectiveness of non-marginal cost pricing is illustrated in
Diagram III C. In this representation the TSM output and the slope
of the demand curve do not vary. Only MC has been changed. As pre-
dicted, the greater the positive slope (up and to the right) of the MC
curve at the TSM output, the less effective any given amount of non-
marginal cost pricing-i.e., the smaller _ S-- for any given (RS-).
RS-
Thus, in Diagram III C -- will be FGDC -DEA if marginal cost
RS- FGEC
is steeply sloped (MCs), FGEC if marginal cost is gently sloped
FGDC
(MC2), and FG - if marginal cost is horizontal (MCI). Obviously, theFGEC-
steeper the slope of the marginal cost curve, the greater the reduction
in transaction surplus that will be associated with any given loss in
sales, and the greater (TS-), the less effective non-marginal cost pric-
Ps+
ing, i.e., the lower- 
.
In short, for any given reduction in buyer surplus-i.e., for any
Ps+given (RS-), f will vary directly with the TSM output of the good
RS-
in question and the (negative) slope of the demand faced by its pro-
ducer over the relevant range and inversely with the slope of his mar-
ginal cost curve between the outputs under consideration. 4 For the
Ps+
same reasons, the marginal LS- ratio for further non-marginal cost
APS±-
pricing, APS+ i.e., the ratio of the producer surplus that will bem A' RS- -
24. It should be noted that the slope of the demand curve and the TSAI output do
not determine the elasticity of the seller's demand which equals "Q'/-AP" Thus the
Q2 P
effectiveness of non-marginal cost pricing does not depend on the elasticity of demand,
since it will not be affected by the original or TSM price, if other things are equal.
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gained to the retailer surplus that will be lost through a marginal
reduction in retailer surplus caused by a marginal increase in the
original disparity between price and TSM marginal cost-will also
vary (A) directly with (1) the original output of the good in question
and (2) the (negative) slope of the demand faced by its producer be-
tween the original and proposed prices and (B) inversely with (1) the
original disparity between price and marginal cost and (2) the (posi-
tive) slope of the producer's marginal cost curve between the outputs
under consideration.
Thus, to the extent that (1) the TSM (unit) output of B exceeds that
of A, (2) Y1 ... N's operative post-tie-in demand for B-DD.nBYu... N-
is sloped more steeply than their operative demand for A to the left of
the TSM output, and (3) MCBx is less steeply sloped than MCAx be-
tween the outputs in question, B will be more suitable for non-marginal
cost pricing than A. Accordingly, where some product B with the
characteristics just delineated can be found, X will be able to increase
his profits by charging his customers his TSM marginal cost for A and
raising his price of B above its prevailing market price (or above his
pre-tie-in profit-maximizing price if B is one among several differenti-
ated substitutes) until (1) his customers' original buyer or retailer sur-
P8+
plus is exhausted or (2) the marginal - ratio for B falls below its
counterpart for A. Obviously, where (2) occurs before (1), X will find
it profitable to exhaust his customers' excess expected surplus by non-
marginal cost pricing on A as well as B. In fact, in such circumstances,
X's optimal strategy will be to equalize APS+ for non-marginal cost
ARS-
pricing on each of his tied products2 5 Thus, when Y1 . . . N dis-
tribute several goods whose demands are directly related, X will find
AP'S+
25. In fact, in order to maximize his profits, X would 
have to equalize -
ARS-
on non-marginal cost and lump-sum pricing as well. As we shall see, since the tie-in will
APS
enable X to raise - for non-marginal cost pricing, it will reduce the size of huisARS
optimal lump-sum fee. The divergence between (PS+) and (RS-) for lump-sum pric-
ing reflects the costs of employing this pricing technique-viz., the cost of preventing
or allowing buyer arbitrage, the cost of creating additional risk or shifting risk to a party
with greater risk aversion, and the cost of overcoming or suffering from seller ignorance
and/or buyer pessimism. Obviously, to the extent that his ability to shift the locus of
his non-marginal cost pricing induces X to reduce his lump-sum fee, he will proceed to
eliminate more than his customers' original (based on the pre-tie-in lump-sum fee)
excess buyer surplus through non-marginal cost pricing. See pp. 1427-29 infra.
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it profitable to tie more than one product in this way, i.e., to en-
gage in conventional full-line forcing. By doing so, he will minimize
the transaction surplus lost and concomitantly maximize the producer
surplus gained for any given amount (measured in terms of its costs to
X's customers) of non-marginal cost pricing, i.e., he will increase his
profits and decrease his optimal lump-sum fee.
In many situations, X will be able to identify some product to which
he can transfer some or all of his non-marginal cost pricing profitably.
In the text that follows, three such sets of circumstances will be de-
scribed.
(a) Shifting the Locus of Non-marginal Cost Pricing to an Unrelated
Product
(i) Where the Effects of Advertising and Promotion Are Inconse-
quential
Diagram IV has been constructed to illustrate the way in which full-
requirements tie-ins can increase the profitability of non-marginal cost
pricing by shifting its locus to an unrelated product where the effects
of advertising are inconsequential. It should be emphasized at the out-
DIAGRAM N
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set that the validity of the argument of this section does not depend
on any of the more restrictive assumptions on which the construction
of Diagram IV has been based-e.g., on the assumption that DDnz is
a kinky oligopoly demand curve or on the assumption that MCXAI is
rising. We have adopted these paradigmatic assumptions solely to facil-
itate our visual presentation of the argument. For our conclusion to
follow, it is only necessary that L-- on DDXRBY be sufficiently above its
counterpart on DDxAY over the relevant range to compensate X for
incurring the additional cost of arranging and enforcing2 the tying
agreement. In the previous section, it was shown that this result could
be obtained without making any unduly restrictive assumptions.
The construction of Diagram IV has been based on the following as-
sumptions: (1) that X is the sole manufacturer of some product A, a
successfully differentiated good with a well-defined, separate market;
(2) that Y1 ... N are local retail distributors operating in different geo-
graphic markets who sell B and would like to market A to their customers
Zi ... N as well; (3) that the producers of good B-W1 ... N-operate
in a perfectly competitive market while the distributors of good B-
Y1 ... N and V1 ... N-operate in tightly oligopolistic markets; (4)
that DDxAY and DDxBr represent Y1 ... N's expected demands for A
and B (under a requirements contract) during the period covered by
X's offer; (5) that shifts in ZJ ... N's demand for B are expected with
certainty to be proportional to and in the same direction as move-
ments in their demand for A;20A and (6) that because of seller ig-
norance, buyer pessimism, the uncertainty of the demand for A,
and/or the difficulty of preventing buyer arbitrage, the highest lump-
sum fee that X would find profitable to charge Y1 ... N if his only
alternative were to engage in non-marginal cost pricing on A would be
NKJ minus the discount (NML) that Y1 ... N demand for taking the
risk that DDxAY may turn out to be lower than they expected-i.e., that
26. Under the tying agreement, X's per unit price will be lower on A and higher on
B than it otherwise would have been. Accordingly, the tie-in may increase the probability
that Y will engage in arbitrage on A and raise the possibility that Y may violate his con-
tract by buying B on the open market at its prevailing market price. To the extent that
the imposition of the tie-in increases the cost of allowing or preventing such arbitrage
and contract violations, our textual argument overestimates the profitability of employing
tying agreements to shift the locus of non-marginal cost pricing.
26A. To the extent that this assumption is not justified, the imposition of the tie-In
will increase both X's and Y's risk-i.e., will increase the discount Y demands for risk.
bearing and independently decrease the certainty equivalent value of X's expected pro-
ducer surplus. Obviously, both of these effects will decrease the profitability of imposing
the tie-in in question.
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X's optimal lump-sum fee would be LMKJ if his alternative were non-
marginal cost pricing on A alone. According to our hypothesis, X will
be able to increase his returns in these circumstances by shifting the
locus of his non-marginal cost pricing from A to B, i.e., by tying his sale
of the exclusive (in the market in question) right to purchase A at his
TSM marginal cost27 to his customers' entering into full-requirements
contracts under which they agree to purchase all their B from X for
more than its prevailing market price during the period under con-
sideration. But before we investigate this possibility and delineate some
of the actual commercial contexts in which it is likely to arise, it will be
useful to analyze the way in which our assumptions are manifest in the
accompanying diagram.
Since A is a significantly unique product and Y its sole distributor
in the market in which he operates, DDrAZ will slope downward
throughout. Accordingly, the demand curve that X will face on his
sales of A to Y-DDxAy in Diagram IV-will also be negatively sloped
over the range in question, for MRyAz will slope downward whenever
DDriz is negatively-sloped, and, as we have already noted, DDxAY and
MRY~z will be identical where X is a manufacturer, Y a single pricing
distributor who incurs no non-cost-of-goods-sold marginal costs, and
ZJ ... N the ultimate consumers of the good in question.
For similar reasons, post-tie-in DDIB.r will be discontinuous at Y's
pre-tie-in sales volume AB. As we have seen, the effect of the tie-in will
be to convert DDxBY from DDwny. V2 -S1the demand that would be faced
by X on his sales of B to Y absent the tie-in and is faced by TV on their
sales of B to V-to DD'w'G-the curve that indicates the full value of
B to Y. Since DD'WB will in turn be equal to MRrz (where Y is a single
pricing distributor; ZI ... N, the ultimate consumers of the good in
question; and Y incurs no distribution costs in selling B), post-tie-in
DDxur will be discontinuous as shown where, as we have assumed, Y"
27. Note that we have been assuming that it will be much easier for X to predict his
marginal cost where DDXAy and MCxyA intersect than to determine the position of
DDX1 y itself. However, since marginal costs tend to be constant over a considerable range
before capacity is reached, this assumption does not seem unjustified. See J. Maa'sM A.ND
E. KuH, THE INvEs msNr DECISION 192 (1957); P. SYLOs-L DINI, OLOPOLY AND Trctn-
NOLOGICAL PROGRESS 26 (1962), and sources cited therein.
28. Since we have assumed that B is a standardized commodity that is produced by a
competitive industry, DDWB . will be horizontal at a price equal to the minimum average
total cost of producing B.
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sells B in a tightly oligopolistic market, i.e., where Y faces a demand
curve that is kinked like DDyBz at the prevailing market price.20
The fact that MCx8y--the marginal cost to X of supplying Y with B
-is horizontal in Diagram IV is attributable to our assumption that B
is a standardized commodity that is produced by a competitive industry.
Regardless of whether X produces B himself or purchases B for resale
to Y on the open market, this assumption justifies our construction of
MC BY. If X produces B himself, the marginal cost of supplying B to Y
will be the revenue he could have obtained by selling the goods in
question to V, i.e., MCx1 r = DDx11 v, which will be horizontal if the
industry that produces B is perfectly competitive. If X buys B on the
open market, his marginal cost will be equal to the marginal cost he
incurs when buying B from W,30 which will also be horizontal where
the supply of B is perfectly competitive.
We should now be in a position to demonstrate how a full-require.
ments tie-in will increase X's profits by enabling him to shift the locus
of his non-marginal cost pricing from A to B. Let us assume that Y has
absolutely no bargaining power-i.e., that X will be able to force Y to
surrender all (but not more than all) his excess surplus without losing
his patronage. Since X has already forced Y to pay a lump-sum fee equal
to the difference between NKJ and the discount he demanded for risk
bearing (NML), the largest amount of retailer surplus that X will be
able to eliminate by non-marginal cost pricing without losing F's busi-
ness will be JKIG. If the only technique that X could employ to convert
this retailer surplus into producer surplus was to charge his customers
more than his actual and TSM marginal cost for their incremental
29. The demand faced by the individual members of a tight oligopoly that sells
standardized products tends to be kinked at the prevailing market price. W icre only a
few sellers operate in a given market, price increases by individual producers will fre.
quently not be matched while price decreases will be met immediately. Thus, any seller
who raises his price above the prevailing market level will suffer a drastic reduction In
sales, while producers who reduce their prices will not increase their sales appreciably
(since their price cuts will be matched by their competitors). Clearly, in these circum.
stances, demand will be gently sloped above the prevailing market price and steeply
sloped below it, i.e., demand will tend to be kinked at the price in question. Where such
a kink does develop--e.g., at point M on DDYBZ in Diagram IV, marginal revenue will
be discontinuous at the output in question-i.e., the producer in question will gain
significantly more additional revenue by reducing his price to -the prevailing level thian
by reducing his price below the original market norm. See contra Stigler, The Kinky
Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 55 J. PoL. EcoN. 432-49 (1947). Stigler deline-
ates several cases in which members of tight oligopolies increased their prices in response
to a price hike by one competitor. However, since such examples may consist of cases in
which the position of the kink was raised-perhaps by increases in demand or cost, which
may serve as focal points for oligopolistic cooperation-I do not think that Stigler's evi-
dence is dispositive. In any case, it should be re-emphasized that the argument contained
in this section does not depend on our assumption of a kinky oligopoly demand curve.
30. We assume that the costs of transferring B are zero.
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purchases of A, he would be able to increase his expected producer
surplus (JKHG - HIF) by raising his price GJ above his marginal cost.
The fact that this sum does not equal Y's original excess retailer sur-
plus-i.e., that _PS-- is less than one-is due to the negative impact
RS-
of this non-marginal cost pricing on X's sales and derivatively on the
transaction surplus he generates. In short, this difference between
(PS±) and (RS-) will be equal to the transaction surplus lost as a
result of X's non-marginal cost pricing.
Clearly, in the circumstances we have postulated, X will be able to
convert a higher percentage of his retailer's excess expected surplus into
producer surplus if, instead of raising his price of A above his TSM
marginal cost, he agrees to charge his customers his marginal cost on
their incremental purchases of A on condition that they purchase their
full requirements of B from him as well for more than its market price.
In fact, in the situation represented in Diagram IV, this shift in the
locus of X's non-marginal cost pricing will enable him to raise his -PS+
RS-
rato fomJKRG - HIF
ratio from - to 1, for since DDXnr is vertical over theJKIG
relevant range, increasing the price of B will reduce neither Y's pur-
chases of B nor the transaction surplus generated by X on his sales of A
and B, i.e., will eliminate the difference between (PS+) and (RS-).
Thus, if, in Diagram IV, X charges Y OC-i.e., a price AC above the
prevailing market price-for each unit of B he purchases where
CDBA = JKIG, X will be able to convert all of Y's remaining (ex-
pected) retailer surplus into (expected) producer surplus which he can
enjoy. In short, in the circumstances we have posited, the tie-in will
enable X to increase the profitability of removing his customers' excess
expected surplus through non-marginal cost pricing by KIH minus the
cost of devising, executing, and enforcing (or not enforcing) the agree-
ment in question.
But the profitability of full-requirements tie-ins does not depend
solely on this effect, for such agreements will also increase X's returns
by making it profitable for him to reduce his lump-sum fee below
LMKJ and increase his unit prices correspondingly. We have already
noted that LMKJ was determined to be optimal on the assumption that
the only way that X could eliminate the additional retailer surplus that
would be generated if he reduced his lump-sum fee would be to raise
his unit price on A above OJS, i.e., LMKJ was determined to be optimal
on the assumption that the cost of engaging in further non-marginal
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cost pricing-viz., the transaction surplus that such pricing would
APS+atadaoeoitKo
destroy-would be determined by ARS- at and above point K on
APS+ rtota
DDxAy. However, once the tie-in is imposed, the A ratio that X
ARS-
will confront after exhausting JKIG of his customers' retailer surplus
APS+ ete
through non-marginal cost pricing on B will be equal to ARS either
on DDXBr above point D or on DDxAr above point I, whichever is
higher. Thus, since will almost always be higher either on
ARS-
DDxr~o above point D and/or on DDxAY above point I than on DDXAI'
above point K, the tie-in will usually make it profitable for X to reduce
his lump-sum fee, for obviously the size of X's optimal lump-sum fee
will decrease with the cost of non-marginal cost pricing-i.e., will be
APS+
inversely related to ARS- and directly related to the relative amount
of transaction surplus that further unit price increases would destroy.
Accordingly, unless additional price increases on B make the cost of
enforcing (or not enforcing) the tie-in prohibitive, the tying agreement
will also raise X's certainty equivalent returns by reducing his optimal
lump-sum fee, i.e., by making it profitable for him to lower his basic
charge and eliminate the resulting surplus by engaging in additional non-
marginal cost pricing. Obviously, X will find it profitable to continue
this process until ES± is equal to his lump-sum fee sufficiently to en-
able him to raise his unit price on B to OS (AS = BP), i.e., by SPDC
minus the amount by which X's reduction of his lump-sum fee lowers
the discount Y demands for risk-bearing, for since DDX"r is vertical be.
tween D and P, such a policy will enable X to receive all of the benefits
of additional non-marginal cost pricing without incurring any extra
costs, i.e., without destroying any additional transaction surplus. In
fact, if APS+ is still higher on either DDXROr above P or DDxar above
ARS-
I than on DDxAY above K, X will also find it profitable to increase his
unit price either on B above OS and/or on A above OG and reduce his
lump-sum fee correspondingly. Thus, full-requirements tie-ins will
normally increase their employers' profits by making it profitable for
1428
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them to reduce their lump-sum fees as well as by increasing the amount
of their customers' original expected surplus they can absorb through
non-marginal cost pricing.
In many commercial contexts, actual business conditions approxi-
mate our assumptions sufficiently to justify the application of this
analysis. In fact, many producers who manufacture one or more success-
fully differentiated products could and presumably do use full-require-
ments tie-ins to shift the locus of their non-marginal cost pricing to
standardized goods that their distributors also market as members of
tight oligopolies. The agricultural machinery industry, for one, appears
to satisfy all our necessary conditions. All the major producers manu-
facture a few heavy machines which they have successfully differenti-
ated-i.e., which are demanded according to a downward-sloped
schedule-and several small standardized items that are sold by a large
number of short-line producers as well-and consequently are de-
manded according to a rather horizontal schedule. The demand for
these small standardized tools tends to fluctuate in the same direction
as the demand for the specialized, differentiated machinery. The exclu-
sive dealers of each large manufacturer will usually be the only seller
of the differentiated product in their local markets, which will normally
be quite well-defined-i.e., the demand they face when distributing
the differentiated machinery will also be downward sloping through-
out. Since, in addition to the exclusive dealers of the represented major
companies, only a few local hardware stores will sell the standardized
items as well, retail distribution of these goods will tend to be tightly
oligopolistic, i.e., the demand faced by the exclusive dealers when
selling these smaller items will tend to be kinked at the prevailing
market price. In actual fact, the available data confirms our hypothesis:
full-line forcing (i.e., full-requirements tie-ins) is commonly practiced
by farm machinery manufacturers.3'
Similar opportunities for increasing their profits by shifting the locus
of their non-marginal cost pricing would seem to be available to firms
that sell successfully differentiated lines of clothing, jewelry, electrical
appliances or equipment, etc. to retailers who operate in fairly small
local markets. In each of these cases, the dealer who holds an exclusive
franchise on the successfully differentiated product will also distribute
some other good produced by a competitive industry, distributed by a
31. See, e.g., United States v. J. I. Case, 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. NMinn. 1951). I have not
been able to determine whether the companies in question sold their standardized products
to their dealers for more than their prevailing wholesale price.
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tight oligopoly, and demanded in proportion to the more expensive,
successfully differentiated item. Thus, manufacturers of expensive
clothing or jewelry could require their dealers to distribute their line
of middle-priced imitations; and producers of successfully differentiated
stereos could condition their sale of exclusive franchises on their dis-
tributors' agreeing to give them all their patronage on standardized
accessories82 or other non-differentiated electrical equipment as well.08
Examples could be multiplied, but the principle should be clear. In
each of these cases, manufacturers of final products will be able to in-
crease their returns by tying their differentiated goods to a standardized
product that their distributors also offer for sale.
(ii) When the Demand for the Unrelated Tied Product Is Less De-
pendent on Advertising and Promotion than the Demand for
the Tying Commodity
8 4
Frequently, DDYAz, MfRAz, and concomitantly the total producer
and retailer surplus generated by X on his sales to his distributors
Y1 ... N will be a direct function of the amount of promotion that A
receives from X and Y. In this subsection, we will discuss the possibility
that this relationship may make it profitable for X to shift the locus
of his non-marginal cost pricing in situations in which DDxAy would
not be better suited for this technique than DDxAy if promotional ef.
fects could be excluded.
Clearly, if X and Y were subdivisions of an integrated concern XY,
both would find it profitable to promote good A so long as their incre-
mental selling expenditures were less than or equal to the additional
producer and retailer surplus they generated, for in such circumstances,
92. As we shall see, where accessories are involved, our analysis will be complicated
by the interdependence of the demand for the tied and tying products.
53. The same analysis would apply if A were an irreplaceable input used by a manu-
facturer to produce a successfully differentiated product and B were an essential input
used by the same manufacturer to produce an item which he sold in a tight oligopoly. In
both of these cases, the demand that the manufacturer faced in distributing his final good
would be reflected in the marginal revenue product of the inputs for him, i.e., In the
demand faced by X on his sales to the manufacturer in question. Thus, where the buyer
Y uses A to produce a successfully differentiated product and B to produce a good sold
in a tight oligopoly, DDYAZ, MR YAZ, and accordingly DDXA . will be downward-sloped
throughout, while DDYBz will be kinked at B's prevailing market price, and accordingly
MR, BZ and DD.,,, will be discontinuous at Y's original sales volume.
54. In the text, we will consider a situation in which A and B are final products. The
same analysis would apply if A and B were intermediate products used by manufacturer
Y to produce C-a differentiated good-and D-a standardized commodity-respectively.
In this situation, shifting the locus of non-marginal cost pricing from A to B would
increase Y's incentive to promote his own good G without affecting his expenditures on
his standardized product D significantly.
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any division between producer and retailer surplus would be purely
artificial.
However, such behavior will not be profitable for X and Y when they
do not belong to the same organization, for given independence, X will
not benefit from the retailer surplus his promotional activities produce,
and Y will not profit from the producer surplus generated by his mar-
ginal selling expenditures. Thus, to the extent that X realizes any
profits from Y'S marginal promotional activities, Y will push good A
less than his integrated counterpart, and to the extent that X's sales
campaigns increase Y's returns, an independent X will advertise less
than a manufacturing division of an integrated concern such as XY.
Obviously, since this disparity will reduce the difference between X's
and Y's producer and retailer surplus and promotional costs, it will de-
crease the amount of profits that X will be able to realize by produc-
ing A.
In order for X to be able to overcome this difficulty, he will have to
be able to recover the non-consumer surplus that he and his distributors
generate by promoting A without realizing any producer surplus on his
customers' marginal promotional activities. Clearly, X will not be able
to accomplish this result by single pricing, for this technique cannot
increase his share of the producer and retailer surplus his promotional
activities generate without decreasing Y1 ... N's share of the additional
surplus they create by pushing A. Since X's incentive to promote good
A will be directly related to the disparity between X's marginal cost and
the price he charges his distributors, and I's inversely related to the
difference in question, single pricing will inevitably reduce promotion
below the joint optimum.
Of course, whenever lump-sum pricing is practicable, X will be able
to overcome this difficulty by charging his distributors a basic fee equal
to the non-consumer surplus that XY would realize given optimal pro-
motion for the right to purchase successive units of A at his marginal
cost. In fact, under a perfect lump-sum pricing system, YI ... N's in-
centive to push good A would be no different from their integrated
counterparts', and X's motivation to advertise his product would be only
insignificantly lower than that of a manufacturing division in an inte-
grated concern. Thus, since given lump-sum pricing, F1 ... N will
have to pay no more than X's marginal cost for the marginal units of A
they purchase, i.e., since their lump-sum fee will not vary with their
dollar sales of A, they will realize all of the additional non-consumer
surplus their marginal sales effort generates, and hence their incentive
to push product A will be no different from that of an integrated re-
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tailer. Similarly, since the size of the lump-sum fee that X will be able
to charge in the future will depend on his current promotional activi-
ties, 35 he will be able to recover almost all of the non-consumer surplus
produced by his promotional activities, and hence his incentive to ad-
vertise his product will be nearly as great as a manufacturing division's
in an integrated concern.
However, as we have seen, the cost of administering such a lump-sum
pricing system will usually be too high to warrant its adoption. Thus,
X will normally have to find some other more profitable means of main-
taining his own and his distributors' incentive to promote his product.
X may be able to achieve part of this objective by conditioning his
sales on his distributors' agreeing to allocate more shelf space to his
product than they would otherwise find profitable, but clearly this
remedy and others like it will leave much to be desired. Hence, unless
DD x: is especially unsuitable for non-marginal cost pricing, X will
find it profitable to duplicate the effect of the lump-sum offer by tying
his differentiated product to some more standardized good whose buy-
ers are less responsive to promotional activity.
By offering his distributors the right to purchase as much of his dif-
ferentiated product as they like at his own marginal cost in exchange
for their agreeing to purchase some other standardized good whose sales
parallel those of A for more than its market price, X will be able to
increase his own and his distributors' incentive to promote good A with-
out incurring the costs associated with perfect lump-sum pricing. Since
under the tying agreement, Y1 ... N will have to pay no more than X's
marginal costs for each additional unit of A they purchase, their in-
centive to push X's product will be no different from their integrated
counterpart's, and since X will be able to recover most of the non-con-
sumer surplus his advertising generates by raising his lump-sum fee
and/or the price he charges for B in future tying agreements, the tie-in
will provide him with almost as much motivation to promote his prod-
uct as a vertical merger. Thus, even if post-tie-in DDR would be no
more suitable for non-marginal cost pricing than DDxAy if promotional
activity were held constant, X may find that he can increase his returns
by shifting all or part of his non-marginal cost pricing from A to B
where B's buyers are less responsive to promotional activity than A's.
35. Both because of the effect of future advertising on future demand and because of
its impact on Y1 ... N's expectations regarding X's future behavior. (Obviously, since the
size of the lump-sum fee that Y1 . . . N will be willing to pay will depend upon the
amount of advertising that they expect X to undertake during the period covered by
his offer, they will adjust their offer in light of this supplier's past performance.)
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• *X X.DDxAY - MRYAZ
DIAGRAM V
Diagram V illustrates this possibility. DDrAz, MRrAz, and DDTAr
have all been constructed on the assumption that X and Y engage in the
amount of promotional activity that they would find profitable if X
charged Y1 ... N SPN for the right to purchase as much A as they like
at price ON per unit. On the other hand, DDyAz, MR;A,, and DD.Ar
have been constructed on the assumption that X and Y engage in the
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amount of promotional activity that they would find profitable if X
charged Y1 ... N SPN for the right to purchase as much A as they like
at price OJ per unit on condition that they also agree to purchase all
their requirements of B at OG per unit, i.e., for AG more than its pre-
vailing market price during the period under consideration. Since the
tie-in will increase X's and Y's incentive to promote good A, DDAZ,
MR Az, and DDIAY will exceed DDrAz, MRrAz, and DDxAY respectively
whenever A's buyers can be influenced by additional promotional ex-
penditures. Obviously, in constructing Diagram V, we have assumed
that A's final consumers do respond to X's and Y's incremental sales
effort.
However, this assumption has not been made about the final con-
sumers of product B. Indeed, in constructing Diagram V, we have
assumed that product B is a standardized good that neither X nor Y
finds profitable to advertise. Accordingly, shifting X's non-marginal cost
pricing from A to B will not change DDrnz, MRrBz, or DD.Xr, i.e.,
DDYBz = DD Bz and DDxBy = DDxBY.
We should now be in a position to illustrate the way in which the
effect of a tie-in on X's and Y's promotional activities may make it profit-
able for X to shift the locus of his non-marginal cost pricing from A to
B. Let us assume at the outset that A's sales are not a function of X's and
Y's promotional activity, i.e., that DDxAy = DDxAY. If, under these cir-
cumstances, the highest lump-sum fee that X will find profitable to
charge Y1 ... N if his only alternative is non-marginal cost pricing on
A is SNP minus the non-cost-of-goods-sold expenses that Y incurs when
distributing A and the discount Y demands for risk-bearing, X will
have to decide whether to absorb his retailers' remaining expected sur-
plus NPLJ = EFDA (1) by charging his customers ON for their mar-
ginal purchases of A or (2) by allowing his customers to purchase A
at his TSM price OJ on condition that they also purchase all their re-
quirements of B for EA above its prevailing market price OA. Clearly,
PS+
since DDxBy is much less steeply sloped than DDxxsr, - will be much
higher on A than on B over most of the range in question. In fact, al-
though marginal :S- may be higher on DDxztr at price OA than on
RS-
DDxAY at price ON, the cost of devising, executing, and policing the
tying agreement will probably exceed its potential benefits to X if other
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things are equal. Thus, X would not find it profitable to force his cus-
tomers to accept a tie-in if its imposition would not change DDxAy.
Clearly, however, this conclusion may no longer be justified if we
relax our assumption that the tying agreement will not affect X's and
Y's selling expenditures and Z's demand for A, i.e., if we relax our
assumption that DDI, y = DDx, . If, for instance, a shift in the locus
of X's non-marginal cost pricing will generate expenditures that in-
crease DDxAy to DD;1&, X may find it profitable to impose a full-re-
quirements tie-in. Thus, in Diagram V, such an agreement would
change X's expected producer surplus from SPKJ minus the sum of Y's
original non-cost-of-goods-sold expenses and the discount Y demanded
for risk-bearing to SPN minus this sum plus the difference between
GHBA and the additional promotional costs that the switch led X to
incur where GHDA equals NPLJ plus TALS minus the additional
promotional costs that Y incurs as a result of the switch, i.e., when
GHDA equals ls expected retailer surplus on A after the tie-in is im-
posed. Since in any given instance the increase in X and Y's joint re-
turn on A-TMLS minus X's and Y's additional promotional costs-
may more than outweigh the effect of the slope of DDxr, the depen-
dence of DDxAy on advertising and promotion may make it profitable
for X to shift the locus of his non- marginal cost pricing in situations in
which DDIBr would not be better suited for this technique if promo-
tional effects were excluded. (As before, the possibility of imposing such
a tie-in will also increase X's optimal lump-sum fee by increasing the
profitability of non-marginal cost pricing.)
Of course, in many situations, this promotional effect will comple-
ment and not counteract the impact of such full-requirements tie-ins
on the ability of a producer to absorb his retailers' excess expected
surplus. Thus, in general, the greater the responsiveness of A's sales to
promotional activity relative to the sales of B, the greater the profitabil-
ity of shifting the locus of non-marginal cost pricing.
(b) Shifting the Locus of Non-marginal Cost Pricing to a Related
Product Used in Variable Proportions with the Differentiated
Good 6
In this subsection, we will discuss how full-requirements tie-ins
among related goods can enable X to increase the profitability of non-
$6. This argument was suggested to me by Professor Ward Bowman's provocative
analysis of Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE UJ. 19, 25-27 (1957).
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marginal cost pricing by reducing the transaction surplus that this pric-
ing strategy destroys. Although our analysis will apply mutatis mutandis
to tie-ins among final goods that are complements (coffee and sugar), or
substitutes (coffee and tea), we will analyze the case in which X pro-
duces A, an imperfectly replaceable input that Y-a final goods manu-
facturer-combines with its imperfect substitute B and some irreplace-
able good C that is used in fixed proportions to produce some final
good D. Thus, our hypothesis will be that in many situations X will be
able to increase his returns by imposing a tie-in that shifts the locus of
his non-marginal cost pricing away from his differentiated replaceable
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Diagram VI has been constructed to facilitate our exposition3-- For
convenience, we have assumed that D is a differentiated final good
and accordingly that its producer y will face a downward-sloping
demand curve. On this basis, MRYDz has been represented to be nega-
tively-sloped throughout. For similar reasons, Diagram VI has been
constructed on the assumption that D is produced under conditions
of constant returns to scale, i.e., all of the marginal cost curves in the
accompanying diagram have been represented to be horizontal through-
out.
Once more, it will be convenient to establish the behavior of an in-
tegrated concern XY as a reference point for our subsequent analysis.
MC1 = MCD(xy) represents the marginal costs that a profit-maximizing
integrated firm such as XY would have to incur to produce successive
units of final good D. Thus, MC, indicates the cost of producing suc-
cessive units of D with the most efficient production mix that XY could
employ, i.e., with the production mix in which the last penny spent on
A produces the same amount of revenue as the last penny spent on B."9
Where this condition does not obtain, i.e., when M -PAEY) does not
MCA(XY)
equal M-PB(Xr, (when the ratio of the marginal revenue product of
MCB(XY)
A to its marginal cost to XY does not equal its counterpart for B), X will
be able to increase his output, revenue, and profits without changing
his total expenditures on A and B simply by varying the relative
amounts of these inputs he uses to produce D, i.e., where ARPafX)il C ataaj
(read marginal revenue product of A to XY over marginal cost of A to
XY)-7- MRPBrxy) , the marginal cost that XY will incur will be
MCB(XY)
higher than MC in Diagram VL Obviously, therefore, XY will always
find it profitable to induce its final goods manufacturing division Y to
employ an efficient production mix, i.e., to use A and B in proportions
37. I should like to thank Dale Henderson, whose help enabled me to develop this
diagrammatic presentation.
38. Under normal circumstances, D or a dose substitute will be produced by a large
number of local producers.
39. Since C is an irreplaceable input used in fixed proportions, the efficiency of the
production mix will never be disturbed by under- or over-utilization of this particular
input. Thus, since C is an essential input and D is produced under conditions of constant
C
returns,-vill be fixed regardless of the price of C or the output of D.
D
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MRPBY MRPAY
that will equate with .40 Since Y-if instructed to
MCB(X) MCA(XY) MRPnr
maximize its separate returns-will do so by equating withMC~r
MRPAY
MCAY , XY will be able to effect this result by 
setting the shadow or
accounting prices he charges Y for A and B proportional to their mar-
ginal cost to X, i.e., by equating --PBY - MCBY (read price or mar-
MC x MCUx
ginal cost of B to Y over marginal cost of B to X) with PAY MCAr
MCAX MCAX
Where this condition is satisfied, _____will equal where
MCBYr MCa
MCBYi.e., Will equal M PA and Y will be pro-
MCBx MCAX MC wX MCAX
ducing its output with the most efficient production mix that XY could
employ.
We have already noted that an integrated firm such as XY would
maximize its returns by charging its final product manufacturing divi-
sion Y its TSM marginal cost, for given integration any division of
transaction surplus between sellers and buyers will be purely artificial.
Accordingly, Y will be charged X's TSM marginal cost for A, B, and C,
and given these prices, will increase its expenditures on these inputs
until MRPAy = MCAX, MRPBY = MCDx, and MRPor - MCox respec-
MR-PaY MRPBY MRPar
tively, i.e., until -- - - 1. The associated
MCAX MCBX MCox
output--ac in Diagram VI-will therefore be optimal in two senses.
First, since PAY = MCAY = MCAX, PBY = MCY = MCDx, and Par =
MCar = MCOX, MCDY will equal MCDx and Y will produce the TSM
MCAY MCBYywllPo
output of D. Second, and relatedly, since - =wlp
MCAX MCBX
duce this TSM output with the most efficient production mix that XY
could employ.
Correspondingly, deviations from our TSM conditions, i.e., from
marginal cost pricing, will reduce transaction surplus in these same
40. We assume that X, the division of XY that manufactures A, also supplies Y with
B and G, which it buys on the open market. This assumption is not critical, for if X does
not supply Y with B and C, i.e., if Y buys B and/or C itself, X's and XYs costs and rev-
enues will be reduced by an equal amount. However, its adoption will simplify our
diagrammatic exposition,
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two related ways, i.e., both by causing Y to reduce his output of D below
XY's TSM volume and by inducing Y to produce the output of D he
does manufacture with a production mix that is inefficient for the firm
as a whole, i.e., along a marginal cost curve that is greater than MCG.
Thus, for example, if X charges his manufacturing division Y a price
sufficiently above his marginal cost for C to raise MC.nr (read marginal
cost of D to Y) from MG to MC 41 in Diagram VI, XY will only lose
transaction surplus gcb, for since input C is used in fixed proportions,
non-marginal cost pricing will not induce Y to produce output fg with
a different production mix than XY would find optimal, i.e., X's deci-
sion to non-marginal cost price on C will not raise his marginal cost
of supplying the A, B, and C that Y will order to produce various
amounts of D above MG. For similar reasons, if X raises his shadow
price on A and B proportionately above their marginal costs sufficiently
PaY
to raise MCDY from MG1 to MG, XY will lose only gcb, for since --
P.By
will still equal PBX , the change in question will not cause Y to use a
production mix that XY would find inefficient, i.e., X's decision to non-
marginal cost price proportionately on A and B will not raise his mar-
ginal cost of supplying Y with the inputs he demands above M 1C. If,
on the other hand, X follows neither of these procedures but raises his
shadow or accounting price solely on A sufficiently above his marginal
cost to raise MCD-Y to MCs, the associated loss in transaction surplus will
be equal to (gcb + deba), and not to gcb alone, for since PAY
MCAY ilece PBY MC1 r MR.PaY MRf!P~rwill exceed - will exceed ,
MCAX MCDX MCAY MCAX MCX
i.e., Y's production mix will not be optimal for XY and X's cost of sup-
plying A, B, and C to Y will increase from MC, to MC. Thus, when-
ever X non-marginal cost prices one replaceable input, transaction sur-
plus will be lost by inefficient production as well as by a reduction in
the output of the final good in question.
Having established this paradigm, we should now be able to dem-
onstrate the profitability of using a full-requirements tie-in to shift the
locus of non-marginal cost pricing to a related input used in variable
proportions with the differentiated input A. Let's assume (1) that X is
a manufacturer of a successfully differentiated input A; (2) that Y-an
41. We assume that the only costs that Y incurs are the costs of inputs A, B, and C.
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independent manufacturer-uses A, B, and C to produce final good D;
(3) that MRyDz is Y's expected marginal revenue curve during the
period covered by X's offer; (4) that both X and Y can purchase B and
C on the open market for ok and ol respectively; (5) that both B and C
are produced by perfectly competitive industries and accordingly that
MCax and MCnY are horizontal throughout; (6) that om is X's TSM
marginal cost on A and that MCAx is also horizontal throughout;4 (7)
that C is an irreplaceable input while A and B are imperfect substitutes;
(8) that MC, is the MC curve that Y would face if X sold him A, B, and
C at his own marginal cost; 43 and (9) that MC is the marginal cost curve
Y would face if he produced D without using any A at all. Since D is pro-
duced under conditions of constant returns, all the marginal cost curves
in Diagram VI are horizontal, and since the production mix that Y will
employ when A is not available to him is far less efficient than XY's
optimal combination of inputs, MG will be considerably higher than
MG,
If, in this situation, X could engage in perfect lump-sum pricing,
he would be able to realize seller surplus equal to the difference be-
tween hica and the discount Y demands for risk bearing by agreeing
to supply Y with all the A he demanded at X's own TSM marginal cost
rq = om. This sum represents the certainty equivalent value of A to Y
given marginal cost pricing, i.e., it represents the certainty equivalent
value of the difference between the surplus Y would expect to realize if
he did not use any A at all ('ih) and the surplus he would expect to
realize (ca) if he could use A at X's TSM marginal cost rq without pay-
ing any lump-sum fee to X. Let us assume, however, that because of
his own ignorance, Y's pessimism, uncertainty, and/or the cost of
preventing buyer arbitrage, the largest lump-sum fee that X finds profit-
able to charge Y (assuming that his alternative is non-marginal cost
pricing on A alone) is the difference between higf and the discount Y
demands for risk-bearing. Accordingly, X's problem will be to absorb
as much of Y's remaining expected buyer surplus fgca by non-marginal
cost pricing as he possibly can. Our contention is that by tying his sales
of A to Y's acceptance of a non-marginal cost full-requirements contract
on B or C, X will be able to increase the percentage of this excess
expected buyer surplus that he can recover through non-marginal cost
42. This assumption is not critical. However, its adoption will simplify our analysis.
43. The units of A, B, and C have been defined so that one unit of these inputs will
be used to produce one unit of D when XY charges Y its TSM marginal cost for each
of the inputs in question.
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pricing, i.e., X will be able to reduce the amount of transaction surplus
lost concomitant to the elimination of expected buyer surplus fgca.
If we make the immaterial44 assumption that X supplies Y with all
his inputs-even those not covered by the tying agreement, i.e., even
those that Y buys from X at the prevailing competitive market price,
Diagram VI will enable us to demonstrate the validity of this conclu-
sion. As we have already noted, since the seller surplus that will be
gained by non-marginal cost pricing will be equal to the difference
between the buyer surplus lost and the transaction surplus lost, i.e.,
since (SS+) - (BS-) - (TS-), the smaller (TS-) relative to (BS-),
the larger i , i.e., the higher the returns to non-marginal cost pricing.
BS-
On our assumptions, X will be able to reduce Yrs expected buyer
surplus by non-marginal cost pricing by fgca without losing his patron-
age, i.e., X will be able to raise Y's marginal costs from MC to MGs
before Y will reject X's offer. Obviously, since A, B, and C are closely
related inputs, the demand for each will be monotonically related to
the demand for D and tie-ins will be particularly easy to enforce, i.e.,
cheating on B and C will be particularly easy to detect. Thus, in order
to prove our contention, we only have to show that by imposing a tie-in,
X will be able to reduce the transaction surplus that will be lost by
raising MCDY from MC 1 to M3Cs. Since this increase in Y's marginal cost
curve will reduce Y's output by bc and accordingly transaction surplus
by gcb regardless of the way in which it is effected, we will have to
search for some reason why the set of prices that X will charge ' for A,
B, and C under a tying agreement will distort Y's production mix less
than non-marginal cost pricing on A. Fortunately, though not coinci-
dentally, our analysis of the paradigm of the integrated firm has already
provided this reason.
As we saw when discussing the effects of different accounting or
shadow prices on the returns of the putative integrated firm XY, non-
marginal cost pricing on a replaceable input such as A alone will reduce
transaction surplus not only by reducing Y's output of D but also by
inducing Y to produce this lower output with more B and less A than
44. Once more, this assumption is not critical for our analysis since it will not change
the seller surplus X realizes on his sales to Y. This conclusion follows from our assumption
that the markets for B and C are competitive, for when this condition prevails, X could
replace his untied sales to Y with sales to other customers at the prevailing market price.
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XY or X would have found profitable. Thus, if X in Diagram VI does
not impose a tie-in but charges Y some price sufficiently above his TSM
marginal cost on A to raise MCDr to MCs, he will also raise his own cost
of supplying Y with the inputs he demands to produce various amounts
of D from MC1 to MC2 . Thus, if X does not impose a tie-in, his non-
marginal cost pricing on A will decrease expected transaction surplus
by gcb + deba and accordingly will increase his expected seller surplus
by only fged. Clearly, if X reduces his price on A and eliminates the
resultant buyer surplus by requiring Y to purchase his full require-
ments of B or C from him as well for more than its prevailing (competi-
tive) market price, he will be able to improve his position. Thus, if X
charges Y his TSM marginal cost rq for A but requires him to purchase
his full requirements of C from him as well for a price sufficiently above
its TSM marginal cost (i.e., its market price) rn to raise MCDr to MC8,
he will increase his expected returns from non-marginal cost pricing
from fged to fgba, for since C is an irreplaceable input, raising its price
will not induce Y to employ a production mix that XY would find in-
efficient, and the cost X must incur to supply Y with his inputs will
equal MC1 and not MC.. As we have seen, X will be able to accomplish
the same result by tying A to B and raising the prices of both propor-
tionately and sufficiently above their marginal costs to raise MCDW to
MC3, for where PAY = PBr MRPAY will equalMRPB in equilib.
MCAX MCBX' MCMX
rium, i.e., Y will produce with the same production mix that XY would
have employed and the cost that X will have to incur to supply Y will
be equal to MC. (Once more, our basic analysis underestimates the
profitability of imposing such tie-ins, for by increasing the profitability
of non-marginal cost pricing, these agreements place X in a position to
increase his returns by lowering his lump-sum fee and increasing the
extent to which he engages in non-marginal cost pricing.)
Thus, wherever A is a replaceable input, X will be able to raise his
profits by employing a tie-in to shift the locus of his non-marginal cost
pricing to an essential input such as C or to an imperfect substitute
used in variable proportions with his differentiated product. Precisely
the same factors will make it profitable for X to impose a tying agree-
ment where A is a final good; Y, a distributor or final consumer; and
B and C related products used in variable proportions with X's differ-
entiated commodity.
45
45. Admittedly, X could accomplish the same result through endproduct royalties. In
many situations, however, the royalty scheme will be more difficult to enforce than a
full-iequirements tie-in. See p. 1444 infra.
1442
Vol. 76: 1397, 1967
Tie-ins
(c) Summary
In short, regardless of whether X's customers use or distribute goods
that are related to his differentiated product, X will often be able to
employ full-requirements tie-ins to increase the profitability of non-
marginal cost pricing. By so doing, X will reduce the extent to which
his not being vertically integrated limits his ability to take advantage
of the negative slope of DDxA. Of course, in some situations, X may
be able to employ other means short of actual integration (which will
often be prohibitively expensive) to reduce the amount by which his
efforts to increase his own returns take him and his customers away
from their joint optimum positions. Frequently, however, the ability
of full-requirements tie-ins to reduce the amount of transaction surplus
destroyed by any given amount of non-marginal cost pricing will make
such agreements the most profitable or cost-effective weapon for com-
batting the problems posed by non-integration.
2. Measuring the Value of a Differentiated Durable Machine (or
Patented or Secret Process or Idea) to Its Individual Purchasers, i.e.,
Implementing a Meter Pricing System
Before we can understand why tie-ins might be used as metering or
counting devices we will have to establish the value of meter pricing to
producers of differentiated durable products or ideas. Accordingly, this
subsection has been divided into two parts. In the first, the advantages
of meter pricing are explored. In the second, the metering potential of
tie-ins is explained.
A. The Value of Meter Pricing
If we conceptualize an outright sale of a machine as the sale of the
right to use the machine at the seller's TSM marginal cost (zero), the
equivalence of such sales with pure lump-sum pricing should be
apparent. Similarly, if we conceptualize meter pricing as the sale of a
service (the service provided by an intended use of the machine) whose
marginal cost is zero, its equivalence with non-marginal cost pricing
becomes patent. Thus, meter pricing performs the same function for
producers of durable products or ideas that non-marginal cost pricing
performs for manufacturers of less durable commodities. In particular,
by making Y1 . .. N's payments depend on how often they use his
durable product or idea, meter pricing may be able to reduce the
amount -of surplus X loses through his own ignorance as well as
through his customers' pessimism, uncertainty, risk aversion, and
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ability to engage in buyer arbitrage-i.e., to use the machine to perform
services for some of its other potential buyers. It should be noted that
although the importance of some of these functions may be increased
by differences in Y1 ... N's demands-i.e., by the possibility that meter
pricing may produce price discrimination (since such differences in
demand will increase the importance of seller ignorance and perhaps
the likelihood of buyer arbitrage as well), meter pricing may still be
profitable where X's customers' demands are equal. Of course, the
advantages of this strategy will be more or less offset by its tendency to
reduce the extent to which X's customers use his machines--i.e., to
reduce the transaction surplus X generates, but clearly, the benefits of
this practice will often outweigh its costs.
B. Tie-ins as Counting Devices
In many situations, meter pricing systems can be implemented simply
by attaching a meter to the differentiated machine in question. How-
ever, this solution will not always be satisfactory. Even in the best of
circumstances, meters may be tampered with and for many products
(e.g., riveting machines) and all patented or secret processes or ideas,
meters will be unsuitable.
Of course, where conventional counting devices are unsatisfactory,
producers such as X may be able to obtain variable rentals by charging
their customers endproduct royalties. However, this alternative will not
always be viable. In many situations, the tying product's contribution
to Y1 ... N's sales will be neither constant nor predictable. Where it
is not, endproduct royalties will obviously be unsuitable. In any case,
such royalties will not be effective unless X can determine whether his
customers are reporting their sales accurately. This problem will always
be difficult, but it is likely to be particularly acute (1) when Y1 ... N
would not otherwise have recorded their relevant sales-as, for ex-
ample, when Y1 ... N normally do not charge their customers for the
product in question (toilet paper in rest rooms) or where the variability
of the price of Y's endproduct forces X to peg his royalties to unit
rather than dollar sales-or (2) when Y1 ... N can reduce their nominal
dollar sales of A by selling it in conjunction with some tied, over-priced
item. Thus, X will often find that endproduct royalties are not a
satisfactory method of measuring how intensively his customers use his
product.
Accordingly, in many situations, tie-ins may be the most efficient
metering device available to X. Thus, if X's machine is used in fixed
proportions with some other input B, X may find it profitable to
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convert this input into a counting and rent collecting device by re-
quiring users of A to purchase their full requirements of B from him
as well at some margin (equal to the effective meter rate) above its
prevailing market price. Since it will often be easier to determine
whether Y1 ... N are purchasing B from other suppliers than to deter-
mine whether Y71 ... N have reported their sales accurately, such tie-ins
will frequently increase the profitability of meter pricing.
Although a large number of the tie-ins that have led to antitrust
litigation have involved durable machines and complements used in
fixed proportions,4 not all can be explained by this metering hy-
pothesis. As we shall see, if under the tying agreement the tied product
is sold for its prevailing market price, it is likely that the tie-in is being
used to prevent losses that would otherwise result from (1) the fact that
the tied product's prevailing market price exceeds its marginal cost of
production and/or (2) the possibility that a technologically inferior tied
product may be used in conjunction with A. In fact, even where the
tied product is sold for more than its prevailing market price, the
metering function of the tie-in may not be exclusive, i.e., the tie-in may
also have been imposed to prevent the use of unsatisfactory comple-
ments. Thus, it will be safe to conclude that the tie-in is serving solely
as a metering device only if the tied product is perfectly standardized
and is priced above its prevailing market level.
3. Increasing the Profitability of Price Discrimination
Whenever the elasticities47 of Y1 ... N's demand curves are different
at X's uniform single profit-maximizing price, X will be able to increase
the difference between his total revenue and the cost of the goods he
sells by practicing price discrimination, i.e., by forcing his various cus-
tomers to pay different per unit prices for his product. Diagrams VII
A-C have been constructed to illustrate this possibility. The scale of
each of these diagrams is identical, and all points with the same label
have the same coordinates. Thus, OF (and correspondingly MCAx) in
46. Thus, for example, toilet paper has been tied to toilet paper dispensers, Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); buttons to button-
fastening machinery, Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Spedalty Co.,
77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896); staples to stapling machines, Rupp and Witgenfeld Co. v. Elliott,
131 F. 730 (6th Cir. 1904); mimeograph supplies to mimeograph machines, Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); punch cards to computers, International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); salt to salt-dispensing machinery, Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S 488 (1942); steel strapping to applicating machines,
Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); rivets to riveting ma-
chines, Judson L Thomson Mg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 195); and cans to can-
dosing machinery, United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
AQ /A'
47. The point elasticity of demand at any given price is equal to /-.
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DIAGRAM Vif A DIAGRAM M B




Diagram VII A equals OF in Diagram VII B equals OF in Diagram
VII C. The demand and marginal revenue curves in Diagram VII C
equal the sum of their counterparts in Diagrams VII A and B, i.e.,
DDxA(r+y2) = ddxAyl + ddxAy 2 and MRxA(y1+yg) = mrxArl + mrxar.
As indicated, MCAx has the same value in each of the accompanying
diagrams.
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Clearly, since X's single overall profit-maximizing price ON 48 is
higher than the single price that will maximize his returns on his sales
to Y2 (OL)4 9 and lower than his single profit-maximizing price to Y1
(0T),15 X will be able to increase his gross profits if he can raise the
price Y1 pays him for A while lowering his charge to Y2. Thus, by
forcing Y1 to pay him OT rather than ON for A, X will increase his
gross profits by GHW. Similarly, by lowering his price to Y2 from ON
to OL, X will increase the difference between his total revenue and the
cost of the goods he sells by VII.
However, despite its potential profitability, price discrimination will
often be impracticable and/or prohibitively expensive to implement.
Thus, in order to practice price discrimination, X will have to identify
relevant differences in his customers' demands, prevent buyer arbitrage,
force some of his customers to pay higher prices than others, and risk
prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act. Obviously, to the extent
that X can increase the efficiency with which he performs these tasks, his
ability to earn profits through price discrimination will be enhanced.
A. Increasing the Profitability of Price Discrimination When the Tied
and Tying Products Are Not Related
In this subsection, we will consider the possibility that tie-ins may
enable X to practice price discrimination more effectively in the
general case in which the tied and tying products are unrelated. We
have already noted that where A is a durable product or patented or
secret process or idea, X will be likely to use tie-ins to implement a
meter pricing system to reduce the cost of determining his customers'
demands when ddxAyxi, ddxAy .... ddxa'x differ significantly. As we
shall see, tie-ins can serve prospective price discriminators in several
other capacities as well. In fact, tying agreements may help such firms
overcome all of the other obstacles to successful price discrimination.
By concealing the fact that X is charging some of his customers less
for his product than others, a properly devised tie-in can reduce the
risk of prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act and decrease the
48. ON is the demand price that corresponds to the output at which Alxtrl+r )
and MCAM intersect in Diagram VII C.
49. OL is Y2's demand price at the output at which mrxrAy intersects MC in
Diagram VII B.
50. OT is Yl's demand price at the output at which mrxAy, intersects MCAX in Dia-
gram Vii A.
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probability that customers such as Y1 will demand to be charged the
same price as Y2. Thus, if instead of charging Y1 0 T and Y2 0L for
A, X charges both OT and offers Y2 an equal amount of some product
B which Y2 also uses for LT less than its prevailing market price,51 he
may be able to camouflage his price discrimination sufficiently to pre-
vent its detection by the antitrust enforcement agencies and/or cus-
tomers such as Y1. Clearly, to the extent that tie-ins succeed in conceal-
ing such discrimination, they will increase X's prospective returns by
reducing the risk of antitrust prosecution and depriving Y1 of a useful
bargaining point in his negotiations with X.
Second, where B is less transferable than A, such a tie-in may also
decrease the ability of Y1 and Y2 to engage in buyer arbitrage, for
although the tie-in will not affect A's de facto price to Y2, it may force
him to purchase more B than he can use himself whenever he buys A
for resale to Y1. Since, on our assumption of non-transferability, Y2 will
not be able to resell this B without taking a loss, such a tie-in will
reduce and may eliminate his incentive to engage in buyer arbitrage.
Thus, tie-ins can be used in many capacities to increase the profit-
ability of price discrimination. In various situations, suitably devised
tying agreements can be employed to identify relevant differences in
individual or sub-group demands, to conceal price discrimination from
antitrust enforcement agencies and high-price customers, and to pre-
vent buyer arbitrage.
B. Increasing the Profitability of Price Discrimination When the Tied
Product Is a Related Good Whose Prevailing Market Price Exceeds
Its Marginal Cost of Production
Where X produces some good B that is complementary to A and sells
for more than its marginal cost of production, tie-ins may enable him
to increase his returns by decreasing the cost of preventing the losses
that would otherwise result from B's non-marginal cost price. In order
to simplify our analysis and differentiate this function from those
already discussed, we will assume (1) that A-a differentiated product-
and B-a standardized good-are inputs used by Y in fixed proportions
to produce some final good D and/or (2) that X can engage in perfect
51. X could also camouflage his discrimination by offering to sell A to both Y1 and Y2
for OL per unit but conditioning his sales to Y1 on Y1's agreeing to purchase an equal
amount of B for LT more than its prevailing market price. However, since tnder these
terms Y2 would not have to purchase more B than he needed in order to buy A for
resale to Y1, this tie-in will not enable X to prevent buyer arbitrage.
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lump-sum pricing on his differentiated product A. Under either of
these assumptions, X will have no reason to shift the locus of his non-
marginal cost pricing from A to some other product. However, if B is
sold for more than its marginal cost, X may still find it profitable to
force buyers of A to purchase the B they use in conjunction with his
differentiated product from him as well.
DIAGRAM ME
Diagram VIII illustrates this possibility.52 In constructing this dia-
gram, we have assumed (1) that D is produced by combining A and B
with L (labor); (2) that D is produced under conditions of constant
returns; (3) that A, B, and L are used in fixed proportions; (4) that the
units of A, B, and L are defined so that one unit of A, one unit of B,
52. Most of this argument tas originally made by Burstein, supra note 17, at 66.67,
citing Friedman, unpublished lecture.
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and one unit of L are used to produce one unit of D; (4) that Y could
make returns equal to UVW by using some inferior input instead of A;
(5) that X can engage in perfect lump-sum pricing on A without in-
curring prohibitive costs; and (6) that X also produces B, whose pre-
vailing market price exceeds its marginal cost of production.
Before proceeding with our analysis, it may be useful to discuss the
way in which these assumptions are manifest in the accompanying dia-
gram. MCx and MCAI indicate the marginal cost X must incur to
produce successive units of the inputs in question. Since A and B are
used in fixed proportions and D is produced under conditions of con-
stant returns, MGBx, MGCA, MG and MC are horizontal throughout,
and since we have defined the units of Y's inputs so that one unit of
each is used to produce one unit of D, MG1 = MGCA + MCGX + MC
and MG= MAX + PB + MGCL.
We should now be in a position to determine why X might find it
profitable to condition his sales of A on his customers' agreeing to pur-
chase the B they use in conjunction with A from him as well. If B were
produced by a perfectly competitive industry-i.e., if P" = MG1 , X
would not have an incentive to impose a tying agreement under our
present assumptions. Given our supposition that X can engage in
perfect lump-sum pricing, he would simply charge Y UVRN for the
right to purchase his requirements of A at the TSM price OM. UVRN
represents the difference between the returns Y would earn if he could
purchase A for price OM without paying a lump-sum fee (the area
between his marginal revenue [M-RrDz] and marginal cost [1MG 1 =
MCAX + MCG1 X + MCLr] curves) and the profits he would realize if he
did not use A at all-i.e., UVRN is equal to the difference between
WRN and UVW. In what follows, it will be convenient-though not
realistic-to assume that UVW equals zero, i.e., that Y cannot make any
profits without using A. Under this assumption, if B's price is perfectly
competitive, X will be able to earn returns NRW by engaging in per-
fect lump-sum pricing.
However, to the extent that B's price exceeds its marginal cost, X's
returns on A will be lower than they otherwise would have been. Thus,
if B is sold for some price 01 (F1 above its marginal cost) X will be
able to charge Y only WTS (on our assumption that WUV equals zero)
for the right to purchase A at X's TSM marginal cost. Accordingly, if
X does not produce B, his net loss from the non-competitive price of B
will equal STRN = TRP + IKHF. Of this amount, TRP will equal
the transaction surplus lost as a result of the reduction in Y's output of
D from NR to NP and STPN = IKHF will equal the surplus that X
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loses to suppliers of B. Of course, if X produces B in addition to A, his
loss will be reduced to the extent that Y1 ... N buy B from him as well.
Thus, if YJ ... N buy FG of their total requirements of B (F!) from X,
B's non-marginal cost price will reduce the producer surplus he realizes
on his transactions with Y by TRP + JKHG, and not by TRP +
IKtHF.
Indeed, if X produces B, he will be able to eliminate this loss al-
together by charging Y his marginal cost for the B he uses with A. In
fact, if X manufactured only enough B to supply YZ ... N, he could
accomplish this result without incurring any costs at all, for since A
and B are complementary inputs, X could simply match his reduction
in the price of B with an identical increase in his lump-sum fee (or his
single price if X uses that method of pricing A). In Diagram VIII, for
instance, if X reduced his price of B from 01 to OF, he could increase
his lump-sum charge on A from WTS to WRN.w Clearly, the associated
reduction in the producer surplus X gains when selling B to Y (IKHF)
will be more than offset by the resultant increase in his surplus on A
(STRN)-.
In practice, however, X will frequently sell B to buyers who do not
use this product in conjunction with A. To the extent that such sales
are significant, two factors will offset the positive effect of this strategy
on the profits X realizes on his sales to Y. First, since X will presumably
continue to sell B to other buyers at its prevailing market price (F1
above its marginal cost),54 the prospective profitability of making a
selective price reduction to Y-i.e., of engaging in overt price dis-
crimination-will be reduced by the possible costs of being prosecuted
under the Robinson-Patman Act. Second, since X's original price cut
to Y will tend to reduce the price he can obtain in the general market
for B both by inducing his competitors to retaliate and by giving his
other customers an incentive to bargain more intensively, the profit-
ability of such concessions will be reduced to the extent that X sells B
to buyers who do not purchase A. Clearly, in any given case, either or
both of these effects may be sufficient to make it unprofitable for X to
charge Y his marginal cost for B.
53. To the extent that B is a differentiated product, X's speed of service is lower than
his competitors', or Y has valued business connections with his original supplier, X's
ability to raise his lump-sum fee will be reduced.
54. Clearly, if X's sales of B to producers other than Y are substantial, he will not
find it profitable to charge Y his marginal cost for B if in order to do so he has to
reduce his price to his other customers as well, for the positive effect of the strategy on
the profits he earns on his sales of A and B to Y will be more than offset by its negative
impact on the returns he realizes in the general market for B.
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But even if such price cuts are profitable, X will probably not choose
to overcome the effect of B's non-marginal price in this way, for by
employing a tie-in, X will be able to duplicate the effect of a direct
price cut on the profits he earns on his sales to Y without incurring so
great a risk of antitrust prosecution, competitive retaliation, and/or
intensified bargaining. For example, if in Diagram VIII, X offers to
sell Y his full requirements of A at price OL per unit (i.e., at a price
LM below his own marginal cost) in exchange for Y's agreeing (1) to
pay a lump-sum fee equal to WRN and (2) to purchase all the B he
uses in conjunction with A from X as well at the prevailing market
price 01-Fl = LM above its marginal cost OF-he will accomplish
the same result that a direct price cut would have effected (WRN +
I~aF - MEAL = WRN since LM = FI and Fa = LA = NR) without
giving the appearance of having made a discriminatory and/or com-
petitive price reduction on B.
Since under this agreement Y will appear to be paying X the going
rate for B, the antitrust enforcement agencies and X's other customers
will be less likely to detect his de facto price discrimination than they
would had he made an overt price reduction. Although X's competitors
in the market for B will probably not be deceived by this technique,
there are two reasons why their reaction to the tie-in will also tend to
be less severe than their response to a series of comparable price cuts
to YJ ... N. First, while the conventional price reductions might be
interpreted to be part of an unlimited competitive campaign, X's
competitors will realize that the tie-in is restricted to Y1 ... N, i.e.,
while price concessions might make X's competitors think that their
whole market for B was being placed in danger, they will understand
that tying agreements will not affect their share of the general market
for B, but will only affect their ability to make sales to Y1 ... N.
Obviously, since tie-ins will pose less of a threat to X's competitors,
they will be less likely to retaliate to this maneuver than to direct price
concessions, ceteris paribus. Second, while X's competitors may not
realize that X has a competitive advantage when selling B to Y if he
simply cuts his price to these buyers, the tie-in will make it clear that he
can offset his price cuts on B by raising the price he charges for A. Since
the tie-in will be more likely to make X's competitors understand that
they are at a distinct disadvantage when selling to Y, they will be less
likely to defend against the tying agreement than against an overt price
concession.
Thus, whenever X produces some complement B whose price exceeds
its marginal cost, he may profit by employing tie-ins rather than overt
1452
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price concessions to prevent the losses that would otherwise result from
B's non-marginal cost price55 Since it appears that tie-ins are frequently
55. Precisely the same analysis will apply where X single prices rather than lump-sum
prices. Diagram IX illustrates this possibility. Once more, our construction is based on
the assumption that D is produced under conditions of constant returns and that the
units of A, B, and L are defined so that one unit of each is required to produce one
unit of D. We also continue to suppose that Y cannot produce D profitably without using
input A.
'MRyDz
DDXAy= MRyOz- MC(Bf1 y;: MRYDZ-PB;MCLY
DDXAY = MRyOZ - MC(B+L)yr:





Under these assumptions, the demand curve that X will face when selling A to Y-
DDx.y-will be equal to the difference between the marginal revenue curve Y faces
when selling D to Z--MRyDZ--and the marginal cost to Y of the other factors he uses
to produce good D-AMC(B+L) Thus, if B's price is perfectly competitive, i.e., ifCnr =
OH in Diagram IX, X will face DDXAwhen selling A toY. (A- = -0 =OG + OH.)
X's corresponding single profit-maximizing price for A-determined by the intersection
of MR,,, and MC -x will be OW, and his associated returns will be WVOTR.
However, to the extent that B's price exceeds its marginal cost, 1's demand for A and
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imposed by firms that produce the tied product in a non-perfectly com-
petitive market,5 6 this function is probably quite significant.
C. Simulating the Effect of Price Discrimination by Combining De-
mands to Increase the Efficiency of Apparently Uniform Pricing
In Appendix A, we note that the efficiency of single pricing is
directly related to the extent to which the demand faced by the seller
is "bowed upward" to the left of his TSM output. Where buyers who
place a relatively high value on one or more of a seller's products are
likely to place a relatively low value on some of his others, the demand
that the seller faces when marketing a group of his products together
X's returns on A will be lower than they otherwise would have been. Thus, if the price
of B equals P. in diagram IX-i.e., if P, is HL above the marginal cost of B to its pro-
OL, and not OG + OH.) X's corresponding single profit-maximizing price-determined by
the intersection of MRX,t and MAll -will be EV, and his corresponding returns will
ducer, X will face DDXA y and not DD;,, when selling A to Y. (A - a - 00 +
be UMSR, WATSVU less than before. Of this loss, LNJH represents the surplus earned by
B's suppliers and the remainder the transaction surplus lost as a result of 1's reducing
his output of D from OF to OE. Of course, if X produces B in addition to A, the negative
impact of B's non-marginal cost price on the profits he realizes on his sales to YJ ., . N
will be reduced to the extent that Y1 ... N buy B from him as well. Thus, if Y1 I. V N
buy HI of their total requirements HJ of B from X, the effect of B's non-marginal cost
price on the profits X earns on his transactions with Y will be reduced by LMII.
Indeed, if X produces B as well as A, he will be able to raise his profits on his sales
to 1 back to WOTR simply by charging 1 his marginal cost for product B. Although this
strategy will eliminate the profits he originally earned by selling B to Y-LMIH-this effect
will be more than offset by its positive impact on Y's demand for A and correspondingly on
X's returns from selling A to Y. Thus, given his marginal cost price on B, X will once more
charge OW for A and realize surplus WOTR on his sales of this product to Y.
However, to the extent that X sells B to other buyers than Y, the positive effects of this
strategy on the profits X earns on his sales to 1 will be more or less offset by the costs of
whatever Robinson-Patman Act prosecutions, competitive retaliations, and additional buyer
bargaining his overt price concessions to Y engender. Clearly, in any given case, these
costs may be prohibitive. Indeed, even when they are not, X will most likely not choose
to make such overt price cuts on B to Y, for by employing a tie-in, he will be able to
duplicate the effect of such concessions on the profits he earns on his sales to 1 at much
less cost to himself. Thus, instead of charging Y OH for B and OW for A, X will offer to
sell Y all the A he wants for some price O0 per unit (OW = HL) in exchange for Y's agree-
ing to purchase all the B he uses in conjunction with A from X as well at its prevailing
market price OL.
Since QW = HL, the tie-in will enable X to realize the same returns on his sales to Y
as he would by the overt price concession, i.e., QoTR + LPKH = WOTR where QW equals
HL and WOMC? therefore equals LPKH. However, since the nominal price X charges ' for
B under the tying agreement is the same as the price he charges other buyers of this
product, this device is less likely to attract the attention of the antitrust enforcement
agencies and X's other customers than the overt price concession. And since this competi-
tive maneuver manifests X's advantage when selling B to Y more clearly and Is more
obviously limited in scope than overt price concessions, X's competitors will be much legs
likely to retaliate to the imposition of tie-ins than to selective, overt price reductions,
Thus, regardless of the pricing technique X employs on product A, he will profit by
using tie-ins rather than overt price concessions to prevent the losses that would otherwise
result from B's non-marginal cost price.
56. In general, see Burstein, supra note 17, at 67-68.
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may be more suitable for single pricing than the separate demands for
the individual products in question, i.e., single pricing may be better
adapted to some demand DDXCA+B+O)r than to the weighted average of
DDxAY, DDBY, and DDxoy. In effect, by combining the group's demand
for his individual products, the tie-in will enable the seller to simulate
the effect of charging different members of the group different prices
for the goods in question, i.e., by converting his customers' surplus (at
the pre-tie-in uniform price) on the products on which they place a
relatively high value into de facto price cuts on the products on which
they place a relatively low value, the tie-in will simulate the effect of
price discrimination.
Before proceeding to illustrate this possibility graphically, it may be
useful to work through an arithmetic example. Tables I and II describe
a situation in which X sells three products A, B, and C to four cus-
tomers Y1, Y2, Y3, and 74. As you can see, buyers who place a relatively
high value on one of X's products tend to place a relatively low value
on one of his others. If we assume that X's marginal cost for each of
these goods is zero, X's producer surplus will equal his total revenue.
X's optimal pricing strategy can then be determined from the informa-
tion provided by Table II. Since a price of $2 generates more revenue
TABLE I
THE VALUE OF X'S PRODUCrS TO His INDIVIDUAL CusTOm
Customer Yi Y Y4
Product(s)- -
A $3 $2 $ $2
B 2 3 2
C I 1 3 2
A+B+C 6 6 6 6
TABLE II
THE TOTAL IR.V.NUE GENERATED BY VAIOUS SINGLE PRICES
(Equals the Total Producer Surplus WherelAW = 0)
Price $1 *2 $3 $6 Price
Poct(,) Discrimination
A $4 $6 $3 $0 $8
B 4 6 3 0 8
C 4 6 "3 0 8
M(A+B+C) - - - - -
priced individually 12 18 "9 0 24-
A+B+C
pad~agepriced 4 8 12 .24.
1455
The Yale Law Journal
on each of his products than any single alternative, $2 is X's optimal
single price for A, B, and C. However, since Y1 ... 4 place different
values on X's products, X will be able to increase the producer surplus
he realizes by engaging in price discrimination, e.g., by changing '3 $1
for A, Y2 and Y4 $2, and Y1 $3 for the product in question. Thus, the
total amount of producer surplus that X will realize if he practices price
discrimination-$24-exceeds the maximum surplus uniform single
pricing can generate-$18. In fact, since buyers who place relatively
high values on one of X's products place relatively low values on others,
the maximum surplus that X can realize by uniform single pricing on
each individual product will also be less than the surplus that he can
earn by setting a uniform single price on all three products taken
together. Indeed, since in our example, each buyer places the same
value on (A + B QC), X's optimal uniform package price ($6) will
generate the same amount of producer surplus as perfect price dis-
crimination-$24.
We have already noted that this superiority of uniform package
pricing to uniform single pricing should be reflected graphically in the
slope of the associated demands. The information in Table I has been
represented in Diagram X on the assumption that the data are con-
tinuous. As you can see, DDX(A+D+C)r is far more bowed upward to the
left of X's TSM output than DDxAy, DDxny, and DDxor. Thus, our
arithmetic demonstration that uniform package pricing will generate
more producer surplus in the circumstances described is confirmed by
our diagrammatic analysis.
Of course, X could have generated as much producer surplus by
practicing price discrimination in the conventional manner. Neverthe-
less, for three reasons, package pricing will tend to be more profitable
than conventional price discrimination. First, since the value that their
users place on the several products taken together will tend to be more
homogeneous than the value they place on the individual products
taken separately, the tie-in will reduce the cost of price discrimination
by eliminating the necessity of identifying which buyers value par-
ticular products relatively highly (and lowly). Second, since under the
tie-in buyers will have to purchase all the tied products to obtain one
good for resale, package pricing will reduce the profitability of buyer
arbitrage, for, frequently, the original buyer will not need additional
units of the remaining products and transference costs will be high.
Third, the tie-in will reduce the probability of prosecution under the
Robinson-Patman Act, for since each buyer will pay the same price for
the package X offers, price discrimination will be more difficult to
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detect and prove. Accordingly, whenever a seller suspects that buyers
who place a relatively high value on one or more of his products place a
relatively low value on some or all of his others, he may be able to
employ a tie-in to gain the benefits of price discrimination without
incurring all the costs. 5
7
Tie-ins seem to be used as part of a package pricing scheme in many
industries. For example, since the relative values placed on various
types of movies by individual cinema clienteles will differ significantly,
the movie industry adopted the practice of block-booking or package
57. For expositional reasons, we have confined our textual anal)sis to the case in which
Y1 ... 4 buy only one unit of A, B, and C. Precisely the same reasoning will apply where
each customer has a normal, downward-sloping demand curve.
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pricing. Similarly, since individual advertisers tend to place different
relative values on morning, afternoon, and evening advertising space,
many newspapers tie the sale of advertising space in each of their papers
together n8 Thus, the function we are now discussing is more than a
theoretical possibility.
4. Concealing Violations of Maximum and Minimum Price Regula-
tions
Whenever a producer is prohibited from charging his profit-maxi-
mizing price by a maximum or minimum price regulation, he will be
able to increase his gross profits by violating this legal constraint. Thus,
if producer X in Diagram XI successfully evades a regulation that
establishes a maximum price of OE (or a minimum price of OH), i.e.,
if he chooses to charge his customers his single profit-maximizing price
OG-GE above the legal maximum (or GH below the legal mini-
mum)-he will be able to increase his returns by BDC (or FBA respec-
tively). Of course, these prospective gains will not necessarily make it
profitable for X to disregard the relevant regulations, for they will
always be more or less offset by the possible costs of detection and pros-
ecution. Naturally, the lower the probability that such violations will
be discovered, the greater the profitability of setting an illegal price.
We have already noted that tie-ins may be used to camouflage price
discrimination. In precisely the same way, such agreements may enable
producers to conceal violations of maximum or minimum price regu-
lations, i.e., to reduce the probability that such violations will be de-
tected. Thus, by agreeing to sell his customers all the A they want at
the legal maximum price OE (at the legal minimum price OH) on con-
dition that they also purchase an equal amount of some product B
which they use as well for GE more (GH less) than its prevailing market
price, X will be able to charge his single profit-maximizing price with-
out losing the appearance of legality. Obviously, to the extent that such
an arrangement prevents enforcement agencies from detecting X's vio-
lation, it will increase the profitability of evading the regulations in
question. Undoubtedly, in many situations, the certainty equivalent
return to violations undertaken by means of evasionary tie-ins will be
positive. Where they are, the possibility that tie-ins may be employed to
evade such price regulations will arise. Thus, wartime whiskey pur-
chasers were sold price-controlled whiskey at the maximum legal price
58. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S, 594 (1953).
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on condition that they also buy unregulated rum and/or wine for more
than their prevailing market price.69
II. Non-Pricing Functions
1. Preventing the Use of Inferior Complements
X may also employ tie-ins to prevent his customers from using or
selling the tying commodity in conjunction with one or more comple-
ments that reduce the transaction surplus it generates. Buyers may pur-
59. See Bowman, supra note 36, at 22-23.
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sue such behavior either out of ignorance or because their interests
conflict with their supplier's. Thus, purchasers of mimeograph ma-
chines may mistakenly use ink that impairs their proper functioning,00
and automobile dealers may install substandard parts that injure the
performance and reputation of the cars they sell.01 In all such cases, X's
customers' returns as well as his own will suffer.
However, this result will not obtain universally. In many situations,
X's individual customers will find it profitable to use or sell some com-
plement that reduces the overall transaction and producer surplus the
tying product generates. Howard Johnson's restaurant chain may serve
as an example. In general, local Ho-Jos are run by independent pro-
prietors who serve both local residents and interstate travellers. Local
residents-who will tend to be repeat buyers-will be attracted by the
quality and price of the restaurant's food, while interstate travellers-
who will normally not be repeat buyers-will base their patronage on
Howard Johnson's reputation. Accordingly, Ho-Jo restaurateurs in rela-
tively poor areas may find it profitable to lower the price and quality 2
of their non-differentiated products, for by doing so, they may be able
to increase their local patronage without reducing their sales to non-
repeat interstate buyers significantly. However, although the local pro-
prietor will not have to be concerned with the effect of its quality on
the future purchases of interstate customers who prefer higher quality,
Howard Johnson's sales of its ice cream and other differentiated prod-
ucts will suffer if such buyers decide not to patronize its restaurants in
other parts of the country. Thus, a complement that increases the re-
turns of local Ho-Jo outlets may reduce the chain's overall profits,
for since the effect of the individual proprietor's decision on other out-
lets' sales will be external to him, he will not consider this consequence
of his price-quality decisions. Accordingly, if Howard Johnson wants
to prevent such losses, it will have to require its outlets to sell comple-
ments of specified quality. Tie-ins are one way of implementing such
a requirement.
60. This argument was offered in defense in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
61. This argument was offered in defense in Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935). See also International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), and United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32
(1918).
62. Although we have assumed in the text that the local outlet is sellin an Inferior
price-quality combination, the same analysis will apply where a local proprietor finds It
profitable to sell superior goods at higher prices to interstate travellers who would prefer
a lower price-quality combination. Admittedly, this argument assumes that economics of
scale make it unprofitable for the restaurateur to offer both the high and the low price-
quality combinations.
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Of course, tie-ins are not the only way of accomplishing this objec-
tive. For example, the seller could simply send his customers detailed
specifications for the complements they use. Clearly, however, this tech-
nique will be neither costless nor completely effective. Even where
there is no conflict of interest, purchasers may not follow their sup-
plier's instructions, particularly if they are offered an apparently "good
buy" on a complement whose deviations from the standard seem minor
to them. Where the interests of the seller and his customers diverge,
the need to police such requirements will rise accordingly. By insuring
the buyer's compliance,3 the tie-in will eliminate inspection costs and
increase the profitability of preventing the use of inferior complements.
2. Reducing the Aggregate Taxes, Royalties, and/or Franchise Fees
Due on the Tying Firm's Profits or Sales.
We have already seen that tie-ins can help producers conceal viola-
tions of anti-price discrimination statutes or maximum or minimum
price regulations. In precisely the same way, such agreements can be
used to reduce the taxes, royalties, and/or franchise fees that the tying
firm must pay on its profits or sales. Let's assume (1) that in addition
to X's product A, Y1 ... N also consume some product B and (2) that
the marginal tax, royalty, or variable franchise fee rate applied to X's
profits on or sales of A are higher than their counterparts for B." Un-
der such conditions, X may be able to reduce these assessments by con-
ditioning his sale of A at less than his profit-maximizing price on his
customers' agreeing to purchase a specified amount of B at a corre-
spondingly higher price, for by reducing X's nominal profits on or
sales of A, such a tie-in will lower the base to which the higher rate(s)
are applied. Of course, this transaction amounts to no more than a
normal price reduction on A coupled with an under-the-table rebate
from Y, but in some circumstances the tie-in may increase the prob-
ability that X's fraud will not be detected.
Conclusion
Thus, seller-imposed tie-ins can perform several functions that ap-
pear to be totally unrelated to the leverage theory adopted by the
63. We assume that the cost of transferring the complement is sufficiently high to deter
the buyer from reselling the tied product and using an inferior good in its place. In any
case, where the tied product is also branded, such resales will be fairly easy to detect.
64. For instance, B may be a quasi-capital or capital asset while A is part of X's
ordinary inventory, i.e., X's profits on B may be taxed at the capital gains rate and not
as ordinary income. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1221, 1231. Alternatively, A may be
produced with a patented machine, leased under an endproduct royalty agreement.
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courts. Given the functional flexibility of such agreements, it would
certainly be surprising if the Supreme Court's monolithic analysis were
entirely satisfactory. After delineating the functions of buyer-imposed
tie-ins and reciprocity in Part II, we will examine the adequacy of the
Court's reasoning and the desirability of its rulings in the concluding
section of this article.
APPENDIX A: THE PROFITABILITY OF
LUMP-SUM PRICING
In general, the profitability of charging lump-sum fees will be (A)
directly related (1) to the inefficiency of single pricing-i.e., to the per-
centage of maximum transaction surplus that the seller cannot recover
through single pricing; (2) to the size of the transactions involved-
i.e., to the amount of transaction surplus involved;0 (3) to the seller's
relative bargaining power; (4) to the extent to which the demand for
the seller's product responds to his immediate customers' advertising
and promotion 0 and (B) inversely related (5) to the (positive) differ-
ence between the seller's size and liquidity and the financial strength of
his (weighted) average customer-i.e., to the extent to which the seller
is less averse to taking risks than his (weighted) average customer;01
(6) to the variability of his customers' market shares-i.e., to the
(positive) difference between the amount of additional risk his custom-
ers will have to bear under lump-sum pricing and the extra risk he
would have to bear under single pricing; 8 (7) to the costs of devising
and executing the agreements in question; 9 (8) to the costs of enforcing
(or not enforcing) the agreements in question-i.e., to the costs of pre-
venting (or not preventing) buyer arbitrage (i.e., directly related to
the cost of transferring the seller's product);70 (9) to the extent of the
seller's ignorance-i.e., to the costs to the seller of determining (or not
determining) his customers' expected demands-and, derivatively, to
the extent to which his customers' demands differ from each other;71
(10) to the extent to which the seller's customers are unduly pessimistic
about the size of their expected demands and/or about the probability
that their actual demands will be lower than expected; 72 and (11) to
the extent to which suitable products are available for increasing the
efficiency of non-marginal cost pricing.3 Since the relevance of most of
these factors should be apparent from the text,74 we will confine our
65. See p. 1405 supra.
66. See pp. 1430-35 supra.
67. See p. 1410 supra.
68. Id.
69. See p. 1405 supra.
70. See p. 1412 supra.
71. See p. 1411 supra.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See references in notes 65-73 supra.
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present analysis to the two variables that have not yet been explicitly
considered: the overall "efficiency" of single pricing and the strength
of the seller's bargaining position.
Obviously, the higher the ratio of the producer surplus that can be
generated by single pricing to the maximum transaction surplus the
PS
seller could create (the - ratio), i.e., the more efficient single pric-
ing, the smaller his incentive to engage in lump-sum pricing, other
things being equal. In general, the more bowed upward the demand
faced by a given seller to the left of his TSM sales volume (i.e., tile
greater its absolute slope, averaged vertically) and the less bowed
downward his marginal cost curve, the more efficient single pricing.
Diagrams XII A-C illustrate these relationships. Their shaded por-
tions indicate the producer surplus a seller would realize if he set the
single "profit-maximizing" price in the situations represented. In these
diagrams, identical labeling indicates that the curves in question are
also identical. Thus, MC 1 in Diagram XII A is identical to its counter-
part in Diagram XII B, and DD2 in Diagram XII B is identical to its
counterpart in Diagram XII C.
The impact of the shape of the demand curve on the effectiveness of
single pricing is manifest in Diagrams XII A and B. Marginal costs are
equal in both situations. Only demands have been changed. Thus, the
sole difference between Diagrams A and B is that DD is bowed some-
what upward while DD2 is bowed in the opposite direction-i.e., DDI
is sloped relatively steeply near the TSM output and relatively gently
near the S axis while these relations have been reversed in the construc-
BEDAtion of DD2 . The impact of this disparity should be apparent. CFA
PS.
-PS is much higher in situation A than in situation B, i.e., single
pricing is much more effective when demand is bowed upward than
when it is bowed downward. Speaking broadly, this result can be ac-
counted for by two facts. First, the steeper the slope of the demand
curve near the TSM output relative to its average slope throughout, the
smaller the percentage reduction in sales caused by single price "profit
maximization." Thus, in Diagram XII A is smaller than its coun-AF
terpart in Diagram XII B. Second, the gentler the slope of the demand
curve near the $ axis, the smaller the amount of buyer (i.e., consumer
or retailer) surplus that will escape the single profit-maximizing price
if other things are equal. Of course, the ceteris need not always be
paribus, but taken together, these two factors do establish our conclu-
sion that the effectiveness of single pricing will increase with the extent
to which demand is bowed upward.
Diagrams XII B and C illustrate the effect of differing marginal cost
curves on the ability of single pricing to generate and absorb transac-
tion surplus. In these diagrams, demand has been held constant and
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marginal cost has been allowed to vary. Obviously, marginal cost is far
more bowed downward in Diagram XII C than in Diagram XII B. The
-PS.
effect of this disparity is apparent: - is far greater in Diagram XIIM TS
BEDA
B than in Diagram XII C, i.e., - in Diagram XII B is far greater
CFA
DHG - BDA
than (BDA = DFE by construction) in Diagram XII C.
CHGB
Downward-bowed marginal cost curves militate against single pricing
in tvo ways. First, the more positive the slope of the MC curve to the
left of the TSM output, the greater the transaction and producer sur-
plus that non-marginal cost pricing will fail to generate, other things
-e.g., the output at which MC and MR intersect-being equal. Second,
the more negatively-sloped the marginal cost curve to the left of the
single price "profit-maximizing" output, the smaller the transaction
and producer surplus that will be generated on the sales that are ac-
tually made. Thus, roughly speaking, the profitability of lump-sum
pricing will be inversely related to the extent to which demand is
bowed upward and directly related to the extent to which marginal
cost is bowed downward.
The profitability of engaging in some lump-sum pricing will also be
directly related to the strength of the seller's bargaining position, i.e.,
to the extent to which his market power enables him to take away his
customers' original surplus and keep the additional transaction surplus
his lump-sum offer generates for himself. Even if X could devise a per-
fect lump-sum offer, there would be no reason to expect that he would
be able to force his customers to accept these terms, for just as X real-
izes that YI ... N would rather pay their demand price for successive
units of A than do without the product in question, Y1 ... N realize
that, other things being equal, X would rather make additional sales
at his marginal cost than lose their patronage altogether. Thus, X and
his customers Y1 ... N will play a mixed non-zero sum game-i.e., a
game in which neither the total pay-off (here the transaction surplus
minus X's pricing and Y's buying costs) nor the individual players'
share is fixed. Although the outcome of this sport cannot be determined
without a considerable amount of additional information (if it can be
determined at all),75 X's incentive to incur the additional pricing costs
of engaging in lump-sum pricing will obviously increase with the extent
to which he can take advantage of its ability to generate additional
transaction surplus and convert his customers' original surplus into
producer surplus, i.e., will increase with the relative strength of his
bargaining position.
Thus, in addition to the factors discussed in the text, the profitability
75. See T. ScuLzmG, TnE SRATEGY OF CoNFur passim (1960).
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of lump-sum pricing will depend on the shape of the demand and cost
curves faced by the seller and the power he can exercise when dealing
with his customers.
APPENDIX B: FULL-LINE FORCING WHERE THE SLOPE OF
DDxBy IS NEGATIVE TO THE LEFT OF X'S TSM OUTPUT
In the text, we assumed that DDxBY was horizontal to the left of X's
TSM sales volume, i.e., that X either produced B himself in a perfectly
competitive market or purchased B from other manufacturers at its
prevailing market price. Clearly, however, full-line forcing may. be
profitable where these conditions do not prevail. In fact, our previous
explanation of full-requirements tie-ins applies equally as well when
DDxBy is negatively-sloped to the left of X's TSM sales volume. Never-
theless, the shape of DDxBY does affect the mechanical explication of
full-line forcing sufficiently to justify our treating this situation sepa-
rately.
Where the Tied Product is Differentiated and Pricing is Competitive
Diagrams XIII and XIV have been constructed to illustrate the way
in which full-requirements tie-ins operate where X faces a downward-
sloped demand in a market in which prices are set competitively," i.e.,
where X produces some differentiated product B1 that competes with
a large number of similar brands B2 ... M. We have already noted that
where DDxBY is horizontal to the left of X's TSM marginal cost, single
pricing will generate as much producer surplus as X can possibly obtain
directly on B. Accordingly, where these conditions prevail, X will have
no incentive to enter into full-requirements contracts unless they are
incorporated into suitable tying agreements. On the other hand, where,
as in Diagram XIII, the slope of DDxBy is negative, X may find it
profitable to enter into full-requirements contracts without imposing
a tying agreement.
In order to simplify our analysis and isolate this function from those
which increase the profitability of price discrimination, we will assume
that ddxuiyi = ddxB1 r2 = ... ddx xy. Since, under this assumption, no
member of Y will reject X's optimal full-requirements offer,77 DDx!J"r
76. Where B1 is differentiated, X will not lose all his customers if he charges more
than the prevailing market price, for even where prices are not set cooperatively, some
buyers will prefer X's product sufficiently to be willing to pay the higher charge. See E.
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 71-100 (6th ed. 1950).
77. If Y1 ... N did not have identical demands, DDEO would have to be adjusted
to take account of the possibility that some members of Y might reject X's optimal uniform
full-requirements offer altogether. If some did, it is conceivable than DDPIr n
would intersect. (It should be noted that we are defining DDXB1 to represent the amount
of B that those members of Y1 ... N who accept X's requirements offer would purchase
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will be greater than or equal to DD~zr. In general, the greater the
patronage that Y1 ... N would otherwise have given X's competitors
-i.e., the more of B's substitutes B2... Al that Y would otherwise
have used, the greater the effect of the requirements contract on
DDxB.1 5
8
at different prices.) In Diagrams XIV A and B, both D,.,y and DDff, would have to be
adjusted to take this possibility into consideration.
78. Presumably, the higher the price of B, the greater the amount of B's substitutes
that Y1 ... N would purchase if not constrained by a full-requirements contract if other
things are equal. Accordingly, we have constructed DDX01 , and DDX.,r so that the dis-
parity between them decreases as they approach the quantity axis. Admittedly, in many
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Obviously, YJ ... N will not be willing to accept an offer which leaves
them with negative surplus. Accordingly, X's price must permit his
customers to realize as much surplus on the units they would have pur-
chased independent of their contracts as they lose by being forced to fill
the rest of their requirements with B1 rather than B2 ... M. In Dia-
gram XIII, for instance, the highest price that X will be able to charge
under an independent full-requirements contract without losing his
customers' patronage is OE where KGE-the surplus Y1 ... N realize
on their first EG units of Bl3-equals GHA-the surplus they lose be-
cause of their inability to fill their remaining requirements with
B2 ... M (rather than with GH of Bi). X's optimal requirements price
(OE in Diagram XIII) will generate more producer surplus than his
non-requirements single profit-maximizing price (01 in Diagram XIII).
Thus, in Diagram XIII, EHDB is greater than IJCB, i.e., F-DC
is greater than IJFE. Hence, if the cost of devising, executing, and en-
forcing (or failing to enforce) the contracts in question is less than
FHDC - IJFE, X will find it profitable to enter into such agreements
even if an advantageous tie-in cannot be arranged.
Of course, if X also produces a differentiated product A such that
PS+ is lower on DDxAr than on DDXBY over some relevant range, a full-RS-
requirements tie-in will be more profitable than a straightforward re-
quirements contract. Diagrams XIV A and B have been constructed to
illustrate this possibility. Let us assume at the outset (1) that the un-
predictability of DDxAY, X's own ignorance, and the cost of preventing
buyer arbitrage would make it unprofitable for X to charge his custom-
ers a higher lump-sum fee than OqM if his only alternative were further
non-marginal cost pricing on A and (2) that the differentiation of this
product makes it unprofitable for X to enter into full-requirements con-
tracts on A. 70 If, in addition to this fee, X charges his customer his
single profit-maximizing price for A-s-Y1 ... N will realize buyer
surplus 2qs on A. Obviously, since Oe is X's single profit-maximizing
markets, some customers will have such strong preferences for individual brands that
although price increases will reduce their purchases, they will not be induced to shift
their patronage to another product variety. Obviously, to the extent that Y1 . .. N fall
within this category, DD2 6 and will be nearly identical, and the profitability of
full-requirements tie-ins will be reduced correspondingly.
79. Thus, if X has a perfect monopoly of A-i.e., if there are no substitutes for A at
all-Y1 ... N would have to purchase their full requirements of this product from X even
if they were not under a contractual obligation to do so. (It should be noted that this
analysis would apply even if buyers other than Y1 ... N could substitute against product
A.) In general, the more acceptable the available substitutes for A, the greater the potential
gain from entering into full-requirements contracts, if other things are equal. Of course,
APS+
if A is higher at the highest price that X could charge Y for A under an lnde-
ABS-
pendent requirements contract than it is at the comparable price for B, X might still find
it profitable to shift the locus of his non-marginal cost pricing by conditioning his re-
quirements offers on A on the offeree's accepting a requirements contract on B.
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price on A, APS- will be negative above OF, and X will not be able
ABS-
to increase his producer surplus by eliminating his customers' remain-
ing surplus through further non-marginal cost pricing on A.
However, if Y1 ... N also use X's product B in approximate propor-
tion to A, X may be able to increase his total producer surplus by con-
ditioning his sales of A on his customers' agreeing not to purchase any
of B's substitutes B2... M. Since APS will be positive at X's op-
timal pre-tie-in requirements price-i.e., since 01, X's optimal pre-
tie-in requirements price (JMA = ZJ1), is less than O W, the price
below which MCBix exceeds MRxB1 r, X will be able to increase his
producer surplus by using his buyers' remaining surplus to induce them
to enter into a full-requirements contract on B at a higher price than
they would otherwise have been willing to accept. Thus, although 01
is the highest price that X could extract under an independent require-
ments contract, Y1 ... N would be willing to enter into a full-require-
ments contract at price OQ if X conditions his sale of A (at price OF
plus lump-sum fee 09,I) on their accepting these terms on B, for al-
though Y1 ... N would lose QSMI = RSG - ZRQ on B under such an
agreement, this loss would be offset by their concomitant gain on A
(IFQs), i.e., lebQs = QSMI = RSG - ZRQ. Accordingly, although X
could not increase his producer surplus by eliminating his customers'
remaining surplus on A through further non-marginal cost pricing on
this product (since further price increases above OF-the single "profit-
maximizing" price-will reduce producer surplus), he will be able to
convert some of this otherwise inappropriable surplus into producer
surplus by imposing a full-requirements tie-in. In Diagram XIV, for
instance, if X leaves his price on A (O) unchanged and raises his price
on B sufficiently to remove the remaining surplus-i.e., if he raises his
price by IQ-the full-requirements tie-in will increase his aggregate
surplus by QSLI - LMFE. In fact, since APS will most likely still be
Ba
positive on DDxBt after Y's original surplus has been exhausted-i.e.,
since OQ will probably be less than 0 W-X will be able to increase his
aggregate surplus still further by lowering his price on A below the
single profit-maximizing level (at which APS = 0) and eliminating the
resultant surplus by further increases in the price of B. Thus, given a
lump-sum fee of 04, X's optimal combination of prices in Diagram
XIV80 is OT and OA, not OQ and Os, and the additional producer sur-
plus generated by X's optimal tie-in is (TVKI - KMFD)S1-(eitA -
Ipxyp). 8 2 Once more, however, this analysis underestimates the profita-
APS+ oDDAPS± BY
80. I.e., the combination at which on DDXAy equals -- on DDrO"ABS- ABS- xiii"
81. The gain on B.
82. The loss on A. Y will be willing to accept this offer since his loss on B = TVMI -
UH-ZUT will be just offset by his gain on A + M@TA.
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bility of imposing such tie-ins, for by increasing the profitability of non-
marginal cost pricing, the agreements in question will place X in a
position to raise his returns by lowering his lump-sum fee and increas-
ing the extent to which he engages in non-marginal cost pricing.
Obviously, in many situations, the difference between the cost of
devising, executing, and enforcing a tying agreement and an indepen-
dent requirements contract will be sufficiently low to make the tie-in
arrangement more profitable than a straightforward requirements con-
tract. Accordingly, even if the cost of entering into an independent re-
quirements contract is prohibitive-i.e., even if these costs exceed the
associated gains (IMFB - NPCB in Diagram XIV B), X may find it ad-
vantageous to implement a policy of full-line forcing. Of course, in
many situations, the effect of the tie-in will complement and not coun-
teract the impact of independent full-requirements contracts on X's
profits. Thus, full-requirements tie-ins may be profitable where DDxnr
is not horizontal.
Where Pricing Is Somewhat Cooperative
So far, we have assumed that X's imposition of a full-requirements
tie-in would not provoke any retaliation from his competitors in the tied
product market. Obviously, this assumption will not always be justified.
Where X produces the tied commodity in an industry in which produc-
tion is concentrated and/or cross-elasticities are unequal, his competi-
tors will be likely to respond to any aggressive move he initiates. Ac-
cordingly, since the overall effect of full-requirements tie-ins will nor-
mally be to increase X's market share, his incentive to substitute such
agreements for straightfonvard single pricing will be reduced by their
potentially disruptive effect on the tied product market.
However, although X's competitors' retaliation will reduce the profit-
ability of such agreements by lowering both the profits he earns on his
sales to Y and the returns he earns on his sales to other buyers of his
tied product,8 the importance of this possibility should not be exagger-
ated. In fact, there are two reasons why their response to such full-re-
quirements tie-ins will tend to be less severe than their reaction to any
comparable series of competitive maneuvers, e.g., to any series of simple
price reductions or independent requirements contracts that have the
same potential effect on their market shares. First, while the more con-
83. In the text, we calculated the profitability of the tie.in by comparing the producer
surplus it generated with the additional costs it entails. Since the additional cost of en-
forcing a tie-in given a full-requirements contract will be lower than the total cost of
policing the tying agreement, i.e., since the tie-in and contract have joint costs, the re-
quirements contract may contribute to the profitability of the tie-in even if it would
have been unprofitable in itself.
84. X's competitors will probably attempt to counter his aggressive behavior by in-
sisting on full-requirements contracts themselves and/or by offering more favorable terms
to both YI ... N and other buyers in the tied product market. Of course, if X succeeds
in executing his full-requirements tie-ins before his competitors discover his behavior,
they will not be able to compete for YI ... N's patronage until the tying agreements expire.
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ventional maneuvers might be interpreted to be part of an unlimited
competitive campaign, X's competitors will realize that the tie-ins are
restricted to YJ ... N, i.e., that these agreements will not affect their
share of the general market for B (or Bi ... M when X's tied product
is differentiated). Obviously, to the extent that tie-ins pose less of a
threat to X's competitors, they will be less likely to retaliate to such
agreements than to other aggressive initiatives. Second, the tie-in will
make it clear that X is at a distinct advantage when selling to Y1 . .. N,
i.e., that he can give them relatively costless de facto price reductions.
In Diagram XIV A, for example, it would have cost X absolutely
nothing to give Y1 ... N concessions equal to lope in the tied product
market (if lump-sum pricing were unprofitable on A). Since the tie-in
will make X's competitors understand that they are in a comparatively
unfavorable position when selling to Y, they will be less likely to try to
counter the tying agreement than to oppose comparable competive
maneuvers. Thus, although the existence of cooperation in the tied
product market will affect the overall profitability of imposing full-
requirements tie-ins, this factor will not be so important as might be
expected.
Moreover, if we separate the consequences of the tie-ins from those of
the full-requirements contracts, the possibility of retaliation will not
affect their independent profitability, for unless X would not otherwise
have found it profitable to enter into full-requirements contracts on B,
the tie-ins will reduce X's sales and leave his competitors' sales and in-
centive to retaliate unchanged. Thus, although in Diagram XIV B, X's
unit sales under the full-requirements tie-in (TV) exceed his non-
requirements output (NP), they are less than the sales he would have
obtained under an independent requirements contract (IM). Of course,
to the extent that the possibility of retaliation makes the requirements
contract unprofitable, it will reduce the profitability of the require-
ments tie-in as a whole. Admittedly, in many situations, this effect will
deter X from entering into the type of tying agreements that we have
been considering.
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